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ABSTRACT 
 
Fragmentation, which often involves the division of one’s self into professional and 
personal domains that are insulated from each other, is a serious problem for soldiers in 
today’s Army. This type of professional-personal fragmentation arises organically in 
military service. Unfortunately, it also seems that the past 12 years of persistent conflict 
have exacerbated the problem of fragmentation for many soldiers. Given this, I argue 
that any program that the Army implements for moral development should recognize 
fragmentation and provide resources and practices to combat it. 
I contend that the Army Profession campaign, which is the Army’s primary 
program for moral development, fails to meet either of these requirements. Moreover, it 
seems to serve as a catalyst that further fragments soldier’s lives. I believe this follows 
from the manner in which the campaign limits moral aspiration to a domain-specific 
good, professionalism. Thus it seems that the Army Profession campaign is not 
sufficient for soldiers’ moral development. 
Some may point to the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program as the resource 
that the Army uses to address this problem because of its emphasis on the emotional, 
social, familial, and spiritual domains of soldiers. I argue, however, that neither the 
Army Profession campaign nor the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program construes 
these domains as constitutive of moral development. Furthermore, both programs rely on 
experts to train soldiers in their respective concepts. This is problematic because soldiers 
do not find these experts to be credible. 
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I go on to claim that leaders and peers who have a relationship with their fellow 
soldiers, and have earned their trust and respect, should function as the center of gravity 
for character development in the Army. Unfortunately, many leaders and soldiers lack 
the resources to do so. Thus, they often refer fellow soldiers back to the experts. Instead, 
leaders and peers should use the resources that virtue ethics provides with respect to self-
perception, virtue-relevant goals, and the emotions to promote soldiers’ moral 
development. Toward that end, chaplains are well-suited to help leaders and peers gather 
the resources and develop the practices that will contribute to these aims. 
  
  
iv 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
To my wife, Mary, and our boys, Paul, James, and John, who daily inspire me to be a 
virtuous husband, father, friend, and soldier. 
 
 
 
  
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. LeBuffe, and my committee members, Dr. 
Varner, and Dr. Cerami, for your guidance and support throughout the course of this 
project. 
Thanks also go to my friends and colleagues and the philosophy department 
faculty and staff for making my time at Texas A&M University a great experience. The 
thoughts contained within this thesis are the product of the fruitful discussions of several 
seminar classes, as well as the personal assistance you have given me. In that regard, I 
would like to extend my gratitude to Nathan Cartagena. Thank you for your 
encouragement and help throughout this project, and for reading and commenting on 
every draft. 
Finally, I want to thank my mother and father for their prayers, encouragement, 
and interest in this work. To my wife, Mary, you have my deepest gratitude for your 
inspiration, patience, and steadfast support throughout an extremely busy year of study. 
Your love toward me and our boys, as well as your commitment to manage our home 
and family (often in my absence) over this last year, exemplifies the virtuous woman of 
Proverbs 31. I love you and pray this thesis will help others to follow your example. 
  
vi 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
CAPE Center for the Army Profession and Ethic 
CAPS Cognitive-Affective Processing Systems 
CSF Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program 
MAPET Master Army Profession and Ethic Trainer 
MRT Master Resilience Trainer 
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command 
 
  
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... ii 
 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................ iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. v 
 
NOMENCLATURE ........................................................................................................ vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... vii 
 
CHAPTER 
 
I       INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1 
 
Combat and the Fragmentation of a Soldier’s Moral Self ....................... 3 
Persistent Conflict and the Fragmentation of a  
Soldier’s Moral Self ..................................................................... 6 
Character Development in the Army ....................................................... 8 
The Army Profession Campaign .............................................................. 9 
The Problem with Character Development in the  
Army Profession Campaign ....................................................... 10 
The Army Profession Campaign Allows for Further  
Fragmentation ............................................................................. 11 
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness .............................................................. 13 
The Army and Virtue Theorists Share a Common Goal ........................ 14 
 
II  CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT AND THE VIRTUES ........................... 19 
 
The Virtues ............................................................................................. 20 
The Virtues as Character Traits .............................................................. 21 
The Development of the Moral Self ....................................................... 29 
Virtue-Relevant Goals ............................................................................ 32 
Human Flourishing ................................................................................. 36 
Further Considerations ........................................................................... 39 
 
III CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT, THE EMOTIONS, AND SOCIAL 
INFLUENCE ....................................................................................... 43 
  
viii 
 
 
Emotions, Character Development and the 
 History of Philosophy ................................................................. 44 
The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program and Emotional  
Fitness ......................................................................................... 51 
Social Influence and Character Development in the Army .................... 56 
Moral Authority in the Army ................................................................. 58 
Army Profession Concepts and Construal in the Life  
of Corporal Sanchez ................................................................... 63 
 
IV     HOLISTIC CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARMY ................. 65 
 
Trust between Soldiers ........................................................................... 68 
Trust between Soldiers and Leaders ....................................................... 71 
Trust and Holistic Character Development in the Army ........................ 73 
An Alternative Model for Character Development in the Army............ 74  
Holistic Character Development within the Army’s 
Force Structure ........................................................................... 77  
The Role of the Chaplain in Soldiers’ Holistic Development ................ 82 
 
V   CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 85 
 
  REFERENCES............................................................................................................... 89
  
1 
 
CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Today’s Army offers a new identity for all who join its ranks—the Army Professional.1 
Men and women often begin to assume this identity from the very first day they shed 
civilian clothes, and put on their uniforms.
2
 Those who enter the active duty Army must 
serve full-time for a minimum of three years, barring any conditions or behavior that 
would be grounds for an early separation. During those three years, soldiers live on or 
near an Army installation, and spend most of their time learning and inculcating the 
standards, discipline, customs, traditions, skills, and values of the Army. All of this 
contributes to the development of a soldier’s professional identity. This identity coexists 
with their personal identity, meaning not only who they were before the Army, but also 
who they are independent of their roles within the Army Profession.
3
 Together, these 
two identities constitute a soldier’s moral self.  
                                                 
1
 Since 2010, senior leaders in the Army have reinvigorated the concept of the Army professional soldier. 
The professional soldier of today’s U.S. Army is conceptually distinct from the citizen-soldier, for 
example, of World War II. Furthermore, all soldiers, not just officers, are considered professionals in the 
Army’s current understanding. This is also a conceptual innovation. Not all armies describe their soldiers 
as professionals. Ironically, the German Army, which developed and championed the concept of a 
professional military, has replaced the concept by returning to the citizen-soldier ideal. See Paul Robinson, 
“Magnanimity and Integrity as Military Virtues,” JME 6:4 (2007): 267, who writes, “The German concept 
of Innere Führung stresses that a soldier must be a ‘citizen under arms’. Perhaps, in the context of the 
dynamics of honour, this is a more suitable conception of the soldier than the somewhat exceptionalist 
‘warrior’ ethics preferred by some other armed forces.” 
2
 Most of the new soldiers entering the Army arrive at basic training with one small duffel bag of personal 
items, enough to get them through a day or two of travel until they report to their training facility. The 
Army provides nearly every article of clothing they will need from that point forward. In fact, most 
soldiers will not wear civilian clothes again for at least six weeks. During my Cadet Basic Training at the 
United States Military Academy, I remember looking in the mirror at my new haircut, uniform, and 
military bearing, wondering who I was and if my former self would ever return. 
3
 An independent element of a soldier’s life includes, for example, one’s role as a husband. In spite of the 
popular adage, “if the Army wanted you to have a wife, it would have issued you one,” being a husband 
(or not) is not dependent upon one also being a soldier. 
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By “moral self” I mean the cognitive, affective, personal, and social dimensions 
of the integration of moral beliefs to one’s sense of identity.4 One’s identity constitutes 
part of his or her moral self. A soldier’s two identities, professional and personal, are 
better understood as subsets of the moral self that each soldier has. Thus, soldiers 
possess a professional moral self and a personal moral self.
5
 
With both a professional and personal moral self, some soldiers find it difficult to 
integrate the two into one holistic moral self. Nancy Sherman describes that challenge 
succinctly: 
[T]hough soldiers don uniforms and then take them off, the transitions are 
rarely seamless. For many, soldiering is not just a job or a career; it is an 
identity, it is who they become. Leaving it behind is not easy. Finding a 
moral self capacious enough for both civilian and warrior sensibilities 
becomes the presiding challenge.
6
 
As Sherman points out, for many soldiers, the professional moral self eclipses the 
personal moral self. This hinders the accessibility of each to the other. As such, soldiers 
may, perhaps unknowingly, compartmentalize their professional moral self from their 
personal moral self. This compartmentalization within one’s moral self is known as 
fragmentation—a disintegration of one’s life into separate domains that grow more 
                                                 
4
 See Augusto Blasi, “The Development of Identity: Some Implications for Moral Functioning,” The 
Moral Self, ed. Gil G. Noam and Thomas E. Wren (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), 99-122; 
Vincent A. Punzo, “After Kohlberg: Virtue Ethics and the Recovery of the Moral Self,” Philosophical 
Psychology 9:1 (March 1996), 7-23; Larry Nucci, “Reflections on the Moral Self Construct,” Moral 
Development, Self, and Identity, ed. Daniel K. Lapsley and Darcia Narvaez (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 111-132. 
5
 As a result, I understand character development to be the integration of a soldier’s professional and 
personal moral selves. This understanding is compatible with concepts of character development the Army 
has employed in the past. I will discuss this below. 
6
 Nancy Sherman, The Untold War (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2010), 4. There are at least two 
approaches to overcome this challenge: compartmentalize or integrate the identities. Since the Army is 
interested in character, I argue that it must provide a model that integrates. However, in its current model, 
the Army compartmentalizes by inspiring soldiers to embrace the Army Profession and Ethic. 
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insulated from one another such that one domain cannot access the other. Soldiers who 
serve in the Army for any length of time will face the challenge of overcoming the 
fragmentation of their moral selves. 
 I have just described the organic fragmentation that grows as a practical 
outworking of a soldier’s service within the Army profession. This type of fragmentation 
poses a threat even to soldiers who have never served in combat. Yet for those who have 
served in combat, the threat of fragmentation and the challenge to integrate one’s 
professional moral self and personal moral self is made even greater. 
Combat and the Fragmentation of a Soldier’s Moral Self 
Some combat veterans find it more difficult to integrate their professional and personal 
moral selves after they return from deployment. Consider the following quotation from a 
veteran of Afghanistan:   
Every day that passes, I find myself longing for the visceral reality that is 
combat. I can safely say it is only in those fleeting moments of a firefight 
that I’ve felt truly alive. In a society where the transition from warzone to 
civilization takes a matter of days, the rapid change tends to leave a rift 
between two selves. One self is who you were during the war, while the 
other is who you were before it. Readjusting to the world after 
deployment is the reunification of these two selves. After merging them 
together, you are left with the person you have become after experiencing 
the realities of conflict. For some people, this rift is never truly closed—
the second self tugs at the back of the brain, begging to return to a place 
where the adrenaline delivered by combat can be reintroduced.
7
 
Not all combat veterans share the sentiments this veteran expresses. Many veterans have 
no desire to return to combat, particularly those who continue to grieve over the losses 
they experienced there. Nevertheless, the challenge to integrate one’s personal identity 
                                                 
7
 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “On Austin Tice and the Tug of War,” Time, October, 11, 2012. 
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with his or her identity as a combat soldier, and overcome fragmentation, is something 
that some combat veterans face. Based on my experiences serving as an Army chaplain 
in combat, I have seen the splintering effect that war has on soldiers’ lives. Consider the 
following example from the life of a soldier who served in Iraq. 
Corporal Sanchez grew up with a strong sense of doing what is right. He entered 
the Army because he believed his Nation needed soldiers who would do the right thing 
in tough situations. During a deployment to southwest Baghdad, Sanchez was part of a 
cavalry troop that established traffic control points in order to secure neighborhoods that 
were the target of search and seizure operations aimed at confiscating illegal weapons. 
During one such mission, Sanchez was providing security for the traffic control point by 
manning the machine gun from the turret of his vehicle. His section leader, Sergeant 
Taylor, was in charge of the checkpoint and made sure that all the proper control 
measures were in place so that motorists stopped their vehicles at a designated point for 
an identification card check. 
During the first hour of their mission, a car approached the traffic control point. 
It was moving at a normal pace, but the driver was not heeding the warning signs that 
Taylor’s squad posted, and continued to approach the checkpoint. When the car passed 
the warning signs, Taylor gave verbal commands in Arabic as well as hand and arm 
signals to tell the driver to stop. The car kept moving closer to the checkpoint. When the 
car passed the traffic cones, Taylor fired a warning shot with his rifle. The car continued 
to move. Even after driving over the spike strips that the squad placed as a final control 
measure, the car stayed on course and the driver seemed intent on driving close enough 
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to the checkpoint where the blast radius of a car bomb could inflict the most damage. 
Taylor ordered Sanchez to fire his machine gun. Sanchez hit the car and it stopped 
moving. The driver exited the motionless car, and fell to the ground. After searching the 
driver and the vehicle, Sanchez’s section found no weapons or explosive devices on the 
vehicle. However, the passenger, who was the driver’s fourteen year old son, was dead 
from multiple gunshot wounds. 
A subsequent routine investigation of the incident found both Sergeant Taylor 
and Corporal Sanchez acted appropriately within the line of duty and rules of 
engagement. However, in conversations with his chaplain and his close friends, Corporal 
Sanchez continues to ponder, “The Army says I did the right thing, so why do I feel so 
guilty? How can I say I am a good soldier when I killed an innocent boy?”  With respect 
to the Army’s concept of honorable service as a professional, Corporal Sanchez could 
identify himself as a good soldier. However, at the same time, Corporal Sanchez 
struggles to see himself as a good person, because he feels guilty for taking an innocent 
life. His moral self is fragmented. 
I will return to Sanchez’s story throughout this paper to analyze the adequacy of 
purely professional concepts, like honorable service, to help a soldier integrate his or her 
moral self. I will also consider the role that emotion, like the guilt that Sanchez feels, 
serves in the development of a soldier’s character. For now, Sanchez’s story illustrates 
one way in which combat furthers the fragmentation of a soldier’s moral self. Since 
2001, the typical active duty soldier has deployed to combat multiple times. As a result 
of multiple deployments, for some soldiers, the professional moral self may eclipse the 
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personal moral self more quickly and more comprehensively. This presents a challenge 
for character development for soldiers who serve in an Army postured for an 
environment of persistent conflict. 
Persistent Conflict and the Fragmentation of a Soldier’s Moral Self 
While operations in Iraq have ceased, and operations in Afghanistan will slow over the 
next year, Army senior leaders describe the contemporary operational environment of 
the Army as one of “persistent conflict.” This means that many soldiers will remain in an 
indefinite wartime posture, with a regular cycle of deployments still likely. Former Chief 
of Staff of the Army, General George W. Casey, Jr., described persistent conflict this 
way: 
Persistent conflict is defined as protracted confrontation among state, 
nonstate, and individual actors who are increasingly willing to use 
violence to accomplish their political and ideological objectives. While 
we in the Army cannot determine when this era of persistent conflict is 
going to end, we know that—for the foreseeable future—American 
servicemen and women will continue to be in harm’s way defending our 
way of life.
8
 
Given the burdens, responsibilities, losses, and trauma that are commonplace in combat, 
there is tremendous potential in an era of persistent conflict for soldiers’ lives to come 
apart in a relatively short period of time. Even if combat operations subside, an era of 
persistent conflict will entail regular deployments for soldiers.
9
 The demands of the 
                                                 
8
 General George W. Casey, Jr., “Comprehensive Soldier Fitness: A Vision for Psychological Resilience 
in the U.S. Army,” American Psychologist (January 2011), 1, emphasis original. 
9
 “Persistent conflict and change characterize the strategic environment. We have looked at the future and 
expect a future of protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors who will use 
violence to achieve political, religious, and other ideological ends. We will confront highly adaptive and 
intelligent adversaries who will exploit technology, information, and cultural differences to threaten U.S. 
interests. Operations in the future will be executed in complex environments and will range from peace 
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profession will overshadow soldiers’ personal lives, for example, in their time away 
from family. The wife of Brigadier General Sinclair, who is undergoing court martial 
proceedings for sexual misconduct, describes the impact of such prolonged professional 
demands. 
Since 2001, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have destabilized our life. 
We have moved six times in 11 years. On average, our kids change 
schools every two years. Between five deployments, site surveys and 
training operations, Jeff has spent more than six of the past 10 years away 
from his family. None of this is meant to excuse infidelity. I expected 
more of Jeff, and I think he expected more of himself. But we’re fooling 
ourselves if we don’t recognize the larger reality. My friends who are 
married to other combat leaders have been my anchor during this crisis. 
We understand that our soldiers may come home disfigured or injured in 
such a way that we will become lifelong caregivers. We also understand 
that they may not come home at all, and if blessed with a reunion, they 
may carry emotional baggage few could understand. My friends know 
that it could have been their heartbreak as much as mine. This is the only 
time in U.S. history that our nation has fought a decade-long war with a 
volunteer Army. Doing so has consequences. Nothing good can come of 
families being chronically separated for a decade or more.
10
  
It is plausible, as Mrs. Sinclair observes, that the chronic separation endemic to today’s 
Army in an era of persistent conflict is a significant contributing factor to the 
fragmentation of soldier’s lives. Today’s soldiers face a novelty in the history of the 
United States Army, the possibility of spending their entire career in the Army deploying 
every three to five years. Over the course of a twenty year career, that equates to 
spending between four and seven years away from home and often in combat. It seems, 
                                                                                                                                                
engagement, to counterinsurgency, to major combat operations. This era of persistent conflict will result in 
high demand for Army forces and capabilities.” The Honorable Pete Geren and General George W. Casey 
Jr., A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 2008, submitted to the committees and 
subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, 2d Session, 110th Congress 
26 February 2008. 
10
 Rebecca Sinclair, “When the Strains of War Lead to Infidelity,” The Washington Post, November 15, 
2012. 
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therefore, that any model for character development in the Army must take into account 
the organic fragmentation of soldiers’ lives, exacerbated by combat and persistent 
conflict. 
Character Development in the Army
11
 
Given the threat that fragmentation poses to soldiers’ moral selves, I understand 
character development in the Army to include the integration of soldiers’ professional 
and personal moral selves. My view of character development is consistent with the 
Army’s own account found in a doctrinal manual on the “human dimension” in Army 
operations. 
The moral component of the human dimension is rooted in character, and 
from character comes behavior… Therefore, soldierly conduct must 
involve the practice of values and virtues until doing the right thing 
becomes habitual virtuous conduct that takes on the qualities of duty… 
Leaders serve as moral exemplars by their conduct… The objective of 
moral development must be the practice of the military and civic virtues 
and the internalized dispositions to live by those values all day, every 
day, professionally and in the Soldier’s private life. This is what integrity 
is all about—aligning individual and professional values in such a way 
that beliefs and behaviors are internally consistent.
 12
 
                                                 
11
 In my sixteen years of service in the Army, I have seen the Army express a lot of interest in defining, 
developing, and assessing character. When I was a cadet at the United States Military Academy, from 
1991-1995, part of my plebe knowledge was to memorize the purpose statement of the Academy, which 
was: “to provide the nation with leaders of character who serve the common defense.” That purpose is 
now part of a comprehensive mission statement for West Point, demonstrating that the Academy is still 
committed to the goal of producing leaders of character. In 1997, the Army produced a list of seven Army 
Values in order to define more clearly the institution’s professional ethics. Those values are loyalty, duty, 
respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Those values form a mnemonic 
(LDRSHIP), and soldiers in basic training memorize and recite the values daily as part of the Army’s 
project to shape their professional identity. The Army Values have become something of a list of cardinal 
martial values. 
12
 TRADOC Pam 525-3-7, Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 
June 11, 2008, 15-18. 
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This excerpt from TRADOC Pam 525-3-7 stresses the importance of a holistic approach 
to character development, i.e. “aligning individual and professional values in such a way 
that beliefs and behaviors are internally consistent.” Because people’s values are shaped 
within certain social contexts, it follows that it will be equally challenging for soldiers to 
align their individual and professional values when it comes to character development. 
It appears, therefore, that fragmentation is a serious problem the Army faces with 
respect to cultivating character. Unless we adopt a “few bad apples” theory regarding, 
for example, the actions of Brigadier General Sinclair and others, it is plausible that the 
fragmentation I have described significantly contributes to the misconduct of many. 
Concerned over the growing amount of misconduct in its ranks, the Army has taken up a 
new campaign to promote character development. In doing so, the Army rejects the “few 
bad apples” theory, and is pursuing a systemic approach to character development in the 
wake of eleven years of war. In the next section, I will describe the Army’s approach. I 
will then take up the question of whether this approach is the right one. 
The Army Profession Campaign 
In response to several lapses in conduct, the Army launched the Army Profession 
campaign in December 2010. Its purpose was to “refresh and renew our understanding 
of our profession.”13 As part of this campaign, the Army took up the question: “What 
does it mean to be a professional soldier?”  To answer this question, the Army also 
established the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE). One of CAPE’s stated 
                                                 
13
 An Army White Paper: The Profession of Arms, Ft. Monroe, VA: Headquarters, Training and Doctrine 
Command, December 8, 2010, 1. 
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objectives was to develop two institutional concepts, the Army Profession and the Army 
Ethic.
 14
 A second objective was to create character development programs based upon 
those concepts. To fulfill its objective for moral education, CAPE developed a Master 
Army Profession and Ethic Trainer (MAPET) course.
15
 The MAPET course certifies 
instructors who will train others to master the Army Profession concepts and create 
character development programs based upon those concepts. As a result, through the 
MAPET course, the Army Profession campaign has become the center of gravity for the 
Army’s character development programs.16 In the next two sections, I want to consider 
whether the Army Profession campaign provides the right approach to soldiers’ 
character development. 
The Problem with Character Development in the Army Profession Campaign 
In its approach to character development, the Army Profession campaign departs from 
the Army’s previous understanding of character development found in TRADOC Pam 
525-3-7, and inspires soldiers to be professional by embracing the Army Profession and 
Ethic. I contend that, by limiting moral aspiration to a context-specific good, 
                                                 
14
 The Army Profession is defined as “A unique vocation of experts certified in the design, generation, 
support, and ethical application of landpower, serving under civilian authority and entrusted to defend the 
Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people.” The Army Profession, West Point, NY: 
Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, October, 2012 (v. 2), 2.The Army Ethic is “the evolving set of 
laws, values, and beliefs deeply embedded within the core of the profession’s culture. This ethic is 
practiced by its members to motivate and guide the conduct of individual members bound together in 
common moral purpose.” Ibid., 11. Whereas the Army Profession picks out a set of skilled and ethical 
practitioners, the Army Ethic picks out a set of values that guides ethical practice. 
15
 The MAPET Course is “designed for leaders and trainers who are responsible for advising and 
supporting their commanders, commandants, and civilian leaders in managing a professional character 
development program at a unit/organization, or an Army school/center.” Center for the Army Profession 
and Ethic, “Master Army Profession and Ethic Trainer (MAPET) Description,” 
http://cape.army.mil/mapet.php., June 24, 2013.   
16
 Beginning January 2013, the Army will spend an entire year using concepts from the Army Profession 
campaign as the curriculum for its character development programs. 
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professionalism, the Army Profession campaign actually hinders soldiers’ character 
development. This campaign does not adequately appreciate the challenge soldiers face 
to integrate their professional and personal moral selves.  
On the contrary, the Army Profession campaign conceptually and practically 
limits the scope of character development to the professional domain of a soldier’s moral 
self. Moreover, the Army Profession campaign does not identify any emotional 
component to one’s character development, a concept that has a rich tradition in both 
ancient and contemporary accounts of moral psychology. As a result, by not providing 
adequate resources to combat the fragmentation of soldiers’ lives, the Army Profession 
campaign promotes the further fragmentation of soldiers’ moral selves. 
The Army Profession Campaign Allows for Further Fragmentation 
In the Army Profession campaign, character development is the process of embracing a 
professional identity. Consider the campaign’s definition of a professional: “A member 
of the Army Profession who meets the Army’s professional certification criteria 
(competence, character, and commitment).”17 Moral development in the Army consists 
in the aspiration “to achieve the highest levels of excellence in competence, character, 
and commitment.”18 The Army Profession campaign understands a soldier’s character to 
be: “An Army professional’s dedication and adherence to Army Values and the 
Profession’s Ethic as consistently and faithfully demonstrated in decisions and 
actions.”19 Thus, the scope of character development on the basis of the Army Profession 
                                                 
17
 The Army Profession, 2. 
18
 Ibid., 11. 
19
 Ibid., 15.  
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campaign is limited to a soldier’s professional moral self. Furthermore, the Army 
Profession campaign does not consider how professionalism relates to resiliency, 
meaning a soldier’s “ability to overcome, steer through, and bounce back when adversity 
strikes.”20 
Corporal Sanchez is an example of a soldier who needs help to overcome the 
adversity he experienced in combat.
21
 However, his adversity was not simply thrust upon 
him. In Sanchez’s mind, he was the agent that brought about the consequences over 
which he feels profound guilt, and which lead him to question his own character. 
Sanchez needs help to evaluate his character as a whole person, not simply as a 
professional. Unfortunately, in its program for character development, the Army 
Profession campaign does not have the resources to help Sanchez bounce back from this 
adversity because it does not address the feelings of guilt that are contributing to the 
fragmentation between his professional and personal moral selves. In fact, what we find 
in the Army Profession campaign is a conceptual fragmentation between character 
development, which speaks to professionalism, and resilience, which speaks to emotion. 
It is hard to see how the Army Profession campaign helps soldiers to progress in 
their holistic moral development. It does not address the threat of fragmentation and 
limits character development to a concept of professionalism that is vacuous because the 
campaign does not define professionalism much more than “acting professionally.” In so 
                                                 
20
 Karen Reivich and Andrew Shatté, The Resilience Factor (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2002), 3. 
21
 Given the circumstances of the Sanchez story, the word “tragedy” seems more appropriate than 
“adversity” since Sanchez is not simply a passive participant facing circumstances that seem to work 
against his pursuit of the good. Rather, he is the author of his own circumstances. He pulled the trigger and 
took an innocent life. He must come to terms with the consequences of his own actions. While seeking to 
do what was right, it appears he did something wrong; and this is tragic. For the sake of consistency, 
however, I will retain the use of “adversity.” 
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doing, the campaign fails to give an account of how “being a professional” motivates 
ethical conduct across the whole of one’s life. Also, by exclusively promoting the Army 
Profession concepts, the Army has neglected to give an account of the emotions in its 
character development program. 
Conceptually and practically, the Army has created a rift between professional 
ethics, captured in the Army Profession campaign and MAPET course, and emotional 
fitness or resilience. Emotional fitness and resilience is captured in an entirely different 
program, the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program, which has no 
organizational connection with the Army’s character development programs. For a richer 
account of moral development, the Army should integrate an account of resilience in 
such a way that would help soldiers like Corporal Sanchez overcome fragmentation. 
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness 
In 2010, the Army developed the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program to 
address several behavioral health trends among soldiers. Across the force, the number of 
suicides, and the number of cases of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) had grown 
to levels that Army leaders viewed as a threat to the Army’s readiness for future combat 
operations. 
The objective of the CSF program is to cultivate resilience within soldiers. In 
order to achieve this objective, the architects of the CSF program designed four pillars. 
First, they provided soldiers with an on-line self-assessment tool (the Global Assessment 
Tool or GAT) to identify individual strengths and weaknesses in five dimensions of 
fitness: physical, social, emotional, spiritual, and family. Second, they created training 
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modules to accompany the GAT that help soldiers understand the results of their self-
assessments, and develop courses of action to cultivate fitness in each of the five 
dimensions. Third, they developed a Master Resilience Trainer course to certify soldiers 
to serve as unit-level subject matter experts who create resilience programs within their 
organizations, i.e. brigades and battalions. Fourth, they included resilience training in 
professional development courses based on the concepts of the Comprehensive Soldier 
Fitness Program. 
As an Army chaplain, I help soldiers to develop strengths in all five domains of 
the CSF program. But, in particular, I assist soldiers who cope with a variety of emotions 
related to their experiences in combat. I believe the Army’s moral education program 
would be strengthened by incorporating the resources of the CSF program in its view of 
character development. As it stands now, the conceptual divide between moral 
development and resilience manifests itself in the institutional fragmentation between 
the subject matter experts in both programs. I find this additional fragmentation 
problematic, particularly when it comes to cultivating character across the whole of 
soldiers’ lives. In this regard, the Army Profession campaign could achieve more by 
incorporating other resources in its model for character development. 
The Army and Virtue Theorists Share a Common Goal 
Over the last two years of the Army Profession campaign, I have not seen any evidence, 
in my own experience as an Army chaplain or in the campaign’s publications, that the 
campaign’s developers have identified the threat that fragmentation poses to the 
character development of a soldier like Corporal Sanchez. I believe this is an 
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imperfection in the campaign that senior leaders in the Army should address by 
incorporating the strengths of CSF program in the area of emotional fitness and by 
applying these resources to the whole of a soldier’s life. 
By integrating morality and emotion, the Army will have a more robust model 
for character development. Continuing to think through Corporal Sanchez’s situation, we 
should note that the integration of emotion within an account of moral development is a 
distinctive feature and strength of virtue ethics. Robert Roberts states this at the outset of 
his account of the emotions and moral psychology.
22 
The involvement of emotions in what may be broadly termed the “moral” 
character of our lives is pervasive and deep. Because emotions are often 
impulses to act, their quality strongly affects the quality of what we do. 
Those who are prone to strong and inappropriate fear and anger tend to 
act and behave in a certain set of familiar ways, while compassion and the 
emotions of friendship incline people to actions of another kind. These 
two sorts of emotional tendencies, and many others, may coexist in a 
single person, thus making people complex and morally puzzling.
23
 
 
The specific ways in which, as Roberts describes, Sanchez’s guilt, for instance, may 
affect his behavior at a later date is something I will address later. For now, I argue that 
the Army needs to adequately appreciate the complex nature of human beings, which 
Roberts describes, by also accounting for emotion in its character development 
programs. The Army Profession campaign needs to do more than emphasize 
professional concepts in order to promote character development. It needs to address the 
emotions in order to develop better resources to help soldiers combat fragmentation. 
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By applying these resources to the whole of a soldier’s moral self, the Army can 
extend its goals for character development in a way that is consistent with its previous 
commitment to “the practice of the military and civic virtues and the internalized 
dispositions to live by those values all day, every day, professionally and in the Soldier’s 
private life.”24 This broader scope for character development is consistent with some 
virtue theories of ethics, which argue for the cultivation of global and stable traits like 
loyalty, respect, honor and courage.
25
 Recall that the Army shares an interest in these 
types of traits by listing them among the seven Army Values. 
In a number of academic and professional publications, authors have argued for 
the application of a virtue theory of ethics to military ethics. To my knowledge, 
however, no one has focused on the problem of fragmentation, which is a central 
concern of virtue theorists, and which promises a fruitful account of the double-life that 
presents a problem for many soldiers.
 26
 Since the Army and virtue theorists share a 
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common goal in character development, virtue ethics is a good place to look for 
understanding moral development in the Army. 
I propose a model for character development in the Army, situated in virtue 
ethics, that addresses the problem of fragmentation, and can provide the resources and 
practices needed to understand and perhaps mitigate the fragmentation of soldiers. This 
model inspires soldiers to develop character in the professional and personal domains of 
their moral selves, to include pursuing goods external to the Army profession. It also 
takes into account the role that emotion plays in developing character. Because the Army 
is interested in character development and emotional fitness, I aim to provide a model of 
character development that is compatible with current Army programs and 
comprehensive enough to provide further resources to extend the Army’s current goals. 
In the chapter that follows, chapter two, I provide my account of the virtues and 
character development. The account I give is based on a view of character traits that 
takes them to be cognitive-affective processing systems (CAPS). To be virtues, these 
character traits must be both global and stable. In my discussion of the development of 
character traits, I also take up the role that identity plays. One’s identity steers his or her 
virtue-relevant goals, which in turn can motivate the development of one’s moral self. I 
argue that an integrated moral self is a significant aid to one’s pursuit of the good life. 
The good life should not be limited to the attainment of professional excellence. Instead, 
it should consist in the many other goods, professionalism included, which are necessary 
for human beings to flourish. I contend that my account of the virtues and character 
development provides the resources to promote human flourishing (i.e. comprehensive 
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soldier fitness) and mitigate the fragmentation of soldiers’ lives. The emotions serve as 
one component of that comprehensive fitness. So, in the subsequent chapter, I argue that 
an account of the role of emotion is essential to any character development program. 
I begin chapter three by providing some brief historical precedent for giving an 
account of emotion in a theory of character development. Precedent alone does not prove 
that such an account is an essential component to any theory of character development. 
However, it shows that there is warrant for considering the role that emotion serves 
within the context of a soldier’s moral psychology. We also return to Corporal Sanchez’s 
story to see how a failure to address his guilt exacerbates the fragmentation between his 
professional and personal moral selves. This will help us see the Army’s need to 
redesign its character development program, something I take up in the final chapter. 
In chapter four, I extend the account of character development given in the 
previous chapters to provide a new model for holistic character development within the 
Army. In so doing, I hope to show that my model is compatible with the way the Army 
is currently organized to teach, coach and mentor soldiers. In my model, I give attention 
to the role of the chaplain in character development. I intend to demonstrate that my 
model maximizes two capabilities that chaplains already possess as counselors. 
Chaplains help soldiers integrate the professional and personal domains of their lives. 
Chaplains also help soldiers cope with a variety of emotions. Rather than promoting 
chaplains as experts who teach professional concepts, my model encourages chaplains to 
serve as mentors who inspire soldiers and their supervisors to pursue the good life. I turn 
now to consider what this pursuit entails. 
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CHAPTER II  
CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT AND THE VIRTUES 
 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that virtue ethics is a good place to look for 
resources that will help Army leaders and soldiers understand and perhaps mitigate the 
problem of fragmentation. Part of the reason behind my suggestion is that the Army 
shares a common goal with virtue ethics when it comes to character development. Both 
aim toward the cultivation of virtues like loyalty, respect, honor, and courage, as well as 
the development of the whole person across each domain of his or her life. In this 
chapter, I take inventory of some of the conceptual resources of virtue ethics that relate 
to this goal by setting forth my definition of the virtues.  
It is clear from my preceding discussion of the Army Profession campaign that 
limiting character development to professional concepts is insufficient, and even 
exacerbates the problem of fragmentation. Thus, my purpose in giving an account of the 
virtues is to begin to extend our view of character development beyond the professional 
domain. My method will be as follows. I will begin by providing a definition of virtue. 
Next, I will explain it by developing its three central concepts. I should acknowledge, 
however, that my definition raises a further consideration about how the virtues relate to 
the character development of soldiers as opposed to their civilian counterparts. The 
upshot of this consideration is that the type of virtues that soldiers ought to cultivate 
might either complement those that constitute universal human virtue, or they might be 
exceptional. So, before I conclude my account of the virtues, I will briefly address that 
consideration. Throughout this chapter, I will apply the insights gathered from my 
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definition to the problem of fragmentation in order to explain the problem further and 
suggest ways to overcome it. So, let us begin now to consider what virtues are. 
The Virtues 
I understand the virtues to be character traits that contribute to the development of one’s 
united moral self in pursuit of human flourishing.
27
 To further explain this definition, I 
would like to divide it into three parts. In the sections that follow, I will treat each part in 
greater detail. First, virtues may be understood as character traits. Second, virtues 
contribute to the development of one’s united moral self. That is, one’s identity and 
virtue-relevant goals shape his or her moral self. Third, in as much as living well means 
living as a whole person, the virtues relate to human flourishing in two ways. As 
intrinsically valuable, on the one hand, the virtues constitute multiple goods that one can 
enjoy in each domain of life. For the soldier, flourishing can and ought to be more than 
professionalism, which is often what the Army equates with the good life of a soldier. 
On the other hand, the more soldiers develop virtues across the multiple domains of their 
lives, the better they will relate to and enjoy the people with whom they interact in each 
                                                 
27
 John Doris “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics” in Nous 32 (1998):504-530; Lack of Character: 
Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Gilbert 
Harman “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution 
Error” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999):315-33, offer a “situationist” challenge to the 
existence of character traits by citing the experiments of Hartshorne and May (1928), Milgram (1963), 
Isen and Levin (1972), and Darley and Batson (1973). Harman and Doris argue this empirical data from 
these experiments shows that situations are the predominant determinant of a person’s behavior. Thus, 
character traits, understood as personal attributes that are global, meaning sufficiently robust to dispose 
individuals to act consistently across different and novel situations, do not exist. If global character traits 
do not exist, then virtues (understood as global character traits) do not exist. Moreover, if virtues do not 
exist, any account of moral education as character development is reduced to absurdity. In what follows, I 
will describe the response that other philosophers have made to the situationists’ critique by arguing for 
the existence of character traits understood as a cognitive-affective processing system (CAPS) based upon 
the empirical research of social psychologists Mischel and Shoda (1994). 
  
21 
 
of these domains. Thus, virtues are intrinsically and instrumentally valuable. Let us turn 
now to consider how best to construe these building blocks of the moral self. 
The Virtues as Character Traits 
When I say that virtues are character traits, I have in mind a specific concept of character 
traits. I take them to be networks of “beliefs, desires, feelings, goals, expectations, 
values, and self-regulatory plans,” known as cognitive-affective processing systems 
(CAPS).
28
 The components of these networks interact with and activate one another. For 
example, someone’s belief that he has done something wrong can activate the feeling of 
remorse. Likewise, someone’s goal to become a college graduate will work together 
with her expectation that such a goal is achievable. 
Beliefs, desires, feelings, etc. also interact with the external and internal stimuli 
found in the situations of everyday life. These stimuli activate each system as a whole. 
An external stimulus may be something as incidental as the smell of coffee, or as overt 
as an insult directed toward me. Internal stimuli include the belief that I need coffee to 
get started in the morning, or that I should ignore insults. The key variable in these 
systems, however, is not one particular belief, desire, etc. that activates or interacts with 
other components of the system. Nor is it an external or internal stimulus. Rather, it is 
the construals that I make of these system components and of the objective features of 
internal and external situations. Thus, character traits are indexed not to the objective 
features of situations, but to my, i.e. a human agent’s, subjective construal of them. 
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In describing character traits this way, I follow the lead of others who hold to a 
CAPS account.
29
 I, like them, make an important assumption that grounds this view. 
Human beings are interpretive creatures.
30
 We make construals about the way the world 
is at any given moment. Yet, we are also self-reflective creatures.
31
 Thus, we have the 
ability to evaluate our perceptions of the world as well. 
Let’s say, for example, I construe an insult to be innocuous. I would then be 
more apt to feel sorry for the person who insulted me, and not react angrily, as opposed 
to someone who perceived the insult as a threat. Since I am self-reflective, I could judge 
any given construal that I make to see if it is consistent, for instance, with my overall 
perception of myself or with a particular virtue-relevant goal that I have (e.g. the goal to 
be benevolent). Perceptions of one’s self and virtue-relevant goals are concepts I will 
take up in greater detail in my discussion of the virtues and the moral self. For now, I 
invoke these concepts to show that it is possible for human beings to make consistent 
interpretations such that patterns of interpretation develop. These patterns of 
interpretation serve, over time, to reinforce one’s cognitive-affective processing systems 
such that certain character traits not only develop, but become more robust. 
To illustrate this further, I offer the following example from Nancy Snow, who 
describes the cultivation of compassion into a more global trait. 
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Suppose that I show great compassion, but only in certain cases, perhaps 
those involving small, cuddly animals. My compassion is domain-
dependent. I wish that I could extend my compassion to the domain of 
people and take as my goal becoming a more globally compassionate 
person… I begin to monitor and evaluate my compassionate reactions, 
examining them with the plan of self-development. First, I ask myself 
why I show compassion only toward small animals. What is it about them 
that elicits this response? Through reflection, I ascertain that I perceive 
them as vulnerable, and this perception of vulnerability evokes 
compassionate feelings in me. I then ask myself why I do not perceive the 
vulnerabilities of fellow humans.
32
 
In this analysis of her own trait of compassion, Snow illustrates how patterns of 
interpretation, self-reflection, and virtue-relevant goals work in tandem to steer the 
development of this particular character trait. She regularly perceives only certain 
creatures to be vulnerable, upon which her feelings of compassion supervene. However, 
becoming a more compassionate person is a goal within her larger plan for self-
development. By first reflecting on her present patterns of interpretation, she may then 
begin to develop strategies for changing those patterns in order to achieve her goal of 
becoming more compassionate. 
Presently, her expression of compassion is limited to situations involving small 
animals. It is a stable trait, meaning each time she construes an animal as small, and 
therefore vulnerable, she feels compassion. It is also global to an extent. She is 
compassionate to small animals in a variety of settings. However, she wants to make this 
character trait even more global, and thus into something approaching a virtue. If she 
also perceives other creatures, including human beings, as vulnerable, then her trait of 
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compassion will become more global—broader in application than just to situations 
where a small animal is present.
33
 
It is important that we understand how character traits emerge as a product of 
cognitive-affective processing systems, for this will help us see how they contribute to 
one’s moral development. Since we are ultimately interested in character development 
within the Army, I want to show how these systems might function in the lives of 
soldiers. One could posit a host of external stimuli that activate the cognitive-affective 
systems that constitute the character traits of soldiers, especially those who find 
themselves in the complex and confusing situations of combat. So to illustrate how this 
might go, let us return to Corporal Sanchez’s story. In so doing, I will situate the process 
I have just described in his interpretive patterns of the external and internal stimuli that 
activate the systems that constitute his character traits. 
Consider, for instance, the ways that Sanchez might perceive the objective 
features of the check point that he manned in Baghdad. The deliberate movement of a 
car toward his check point in a dangerous neighborhood stimulates his goal to protect the 
lives of his brothers in arms. His construal of the physical control measures (warning 
signs, traffic cones, spike strips) that define this battle space activate his belief that if he 
fires his machine gun at the car it will be a justified use of lethal force. On the other 
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hand, the death of a fourteen year old boy triggers profound remorse on Sanchez’s part, 
because he not only sees himself as the agent responsible for the boy’s death. He also 
sees himself as culpable, and worthy of blame.
34
 Over the course of a year-long 
deployment, Sanchez will conduct over a hundred check points. Some of the features of 
this check point will be duplicated in future ones (e.g. control measures). Other features 
will not be duplicated exactly (e.g. death of a combatant as opposed to a non-combatant). 
For the rest of his deployment, Sanchez could develop different character traits. 
These traits are the product of the reinforcement of certain cognitive and affective 
patterns that follow upon his perception that he is in a situation similar to the one in 
which he killed an innocent boy.
35
 For example, repeated instances where he finds it 
difficult to assess the threat that approaching vehicles pose to his section could make 
Sanchez timid about firing his weapon. Seeing on a regular basis in and around check 
points children who remind him of the boy he killed could make him depressed, should 
he also continue to construe that what he did makes him a bad person. While these 
external stimuli play a significant role in the function of cognitive-affective processing 
systems, they do not function alone. With each thought (assessing a threat), or emotion 
(remorse) that Sanchez has, there are internal stimuli that also come into play. 
On a CAPS view of character traits, mental states function as internal stimuli for 
networks of beliefs, desires, emotions, goals, etc. Thus, with each new thought, motive, 
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or feeling, Sanchez encounters a new internal situation. We have already noted that 
human beings are interpretive creatures. Therefore, once a new mental state is present, 
he will interpret it just as he interprets each external situation. For example, let us 
presume that Sanchez desires to avoid any possibility of killing another non-combatant. 
As a result of this desire, he may judge his timidity and remorse to be good states of 
mind because they help to guard his future actions. Even though these states of mind are 
less than ideal, Sanchez perceives them to serve this larger goal, which he sees as 
essential to being a good soldier. Furthermore, Sanchez’s temperament and “social 
learning history” influence how he interprets each new state of mind.36 I will illustrate 
these effects of Sanchez’s social learning history on his development of certain character 
traits by sharing some more details of his childhood, as well as his training and 
indoctrination into the Army. 
I have, in the previous chapter, touched upon Sanchez’s social learning history 
by noting that while growing up he developed a commitment to doing what is right. This 
social learning history shaped Sanchez’s beliefs that right action is important, and that he 
should be the type of person others can count on to do the right thing. These beliefs not 
only stimulated his desire to act uprightly, they also inspired him to serve his Nation by 
doing the right thing in combat. It is here that we could say Sanchez’s motive to serve is 
the combination of a virtue-relevant goal and a desire to be virtuous.
37
 Sanchez’s goal to 
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enlist in the Army followed from these beliefs and desires, all of which were informed 
by his social learning history. After he enlisted and reported to basic training, the 
officers and non-commissioned officers who trained Sanchez reinforced and redirected 
this background. His experience in basic training is typical of that of most soldiers. Let 
us consider it for a moment. 
During Sanchez’s basic training, his drill sergeants expected perfection, and 
would refuse to consider any excuse that Sanchez might offer for making a mistake. 
They responded angrily to each of his errors, often with personal censures like “You’re a 
terrible soldier!”, “Sanchez, you dirt bag!”, and “You’re going to get your buddies 
killed!” Sanchez felt shameful when his drill sergeants responded angrily to his mistakes 
because he took himself to have failed terribly in their eyes in tasks that he perceived to 
be matters of life and death.
38
 As these feelings persisted, Sanchez also came to construe 
any action of his that resulted in an undesirable outcome as directly reflective of his self-
worth. Furthermore, the life and death stakes connected to his training led him to 
construe his shortcomings as reflective of his moral self-worth. He began to equate 
being a good person with being a soldier who never makes mistakes.  
The ways in which Sanchez’s construal of his experiences in basic training 
reinforced his social learning history illustrates an important feature of the CAPS view 
of character traits. To the extent that one perceives certain outcomes of his or her 
behavior to confirm prior judgments, this way of looking at the world will become 
habitual. For example, construing the anger and personal derision of his drill sergeants as 
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confirmation that indeed his moral self-worth relates exclusively to his actions as a 
soldier, reinforces the beliefs, desires, feelings, goals, etc. active in the process of 
Sanchez developing a particular trait. In his case, that trait may be something akin to 
moral uprightness. Here, being a morally upright person means being a technically and 
tactically proficient soldier. As Sanchez makes similar judgments about himself in future 
situations, this network of mental states will become more robust. As Sanchez continues 
to construe what it means to be moral in this way, this network of mental states will 
continue to activate and will become a stable character trait. With further reinforcement, 
it is possible that he will manifest this character trait not only in training events that he 
takes to be similar to those in basic training, but also in situations, like combat, that are 
entirely novel. In this way, the trait will become both stable and global, approaching 
something like the virtue of honor. 
The CAPS account of character traits that I have just described highlights the 
ways in which certain traits develop. Moreover, it also accounts for the organic 
fragmentation of a soldier’s life that I mentioned in the previous chapter. Even in basic 
training, a soldier’s moral self can begin to pull apart such that no domain of life other 
than the professional informs the soldier’s self-evaluation. Recall Nancy Snow’s 
example of her domain-specific (i.e. situations with small animals present) trait of 
compassion. For soldiers like Sanchez, being a good person, morally speaking, can also 
be domain-specific. It is narrowly defined as being a technically and tactically proficient 
soldier—a soldier who does not make mistakes. In the former example, Snow’s self-
reflection about her reasons for restricting compassion to one domain is a resource that is 
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available for her to mitigate the fragmentation of her moral self with respect to this 
particular character trait. I suggest that soldiers use self-reflection to carve out the 
multiple roles of their lives and to select virtue-relevant goals—goals pertaining to the 
content of certain virtues—in a particular manner to begin to overcome their own 
fragmentation. 
When we talk about character and the virtues, we do so with the goal of 
developing a united moral self. Throughout the process of character development, 
soldiers must reflect upon who they are and who they want to be. This calls for a sense 
of self that recognizes the multiple identities that one possesses (e.g. professional and 
personal). It also requires some means to relate those multiple identities with each other 
in order to develop united moral selves. 
The Development of the Moral Self 
As I have mentioned previously, I understand the moral self to consist of the personal, 
cognitive, affective, and social dimensions of the integration of moral beliefs to one’s 
sense of identity. This understanding follows from a fundamental assumption, consistent 
with a CAPS account of the virtues, that human beings are self-reflective and 
interpretive creatures. Human beings can look at their lives, reflect on who they are and 
who they want to be, and interpret morally salient situations in light of that identity. On 
this view, the moral self also consists of both cognitive and affective components. 
People make judgments about the content, value, or relevance to their lives of certain 
moral beliefs, but they also have certain feelings about the role these beliefs play in their 
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lives. Finally, their encounter with moral beliefs and their evaluation of their importance 
and relevance to their lives occurs in the context of their interaction with other people. 
When people become parents, for example, they not only step into a new set of 
circumstances, they also assume a new identity.
39
 In their minds, “being a parent” entails 
certain moral responsibilities toward their children. Yet they also love their children, and 
therefore want to care for them properly. Let us suppose that one moral belief they 
consider of value and of relevance as a parent is patience. As a result, on the occasion 
that a child of theirs is slow to understand or respond to one of their requests, they 
perceive that a moral issue is at stake—namely, whether they ought to exercise patience 
or not, based on their identity as a parent.
40
  
At the same time, their identity as a parent is only one identity that comprises 
their moral selves. They may also be a spouse, an officer in the Army, a friend, etc. My 
concern, therefore, in the present discussion is to consider whether the possession of 
multiple identities helps or inhibits moral development. We might think that having 
multiple identities necessarily entails the fragmentation of soldiers’ moral selves. In 
other words, it just may be the case that the complex nature of human identity makes 
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fragmentation a foregone conclusion. Perhaps it is something we must accept as a fact of 
living in relationship with ourselves and others. 
While I believe that people do have multiple identities whose unique 
responsibilities can sometimes be sources of conflict, I do not accept the conclusion that 
people cannot mitigate the fragmentation of their lives. Neither does the Army, which 
we have seen is, doctrinally anyway, committed to holistic character development (even 
though its current program is not in step with this doctrine). We both aim to develop 
soldiers who place moral concerns at the center of their sense of self, and will seek to act 
consistently with that self-perception. Furthermore, we want soldiers who do not limit 
moral concerns to one domain of life, but who “live by those values all day, every day, 
professionally and in the Soldier’s private life.”41 Thus, in terms of their identities, we 
want soldiers to see themselves as more than simply members of the profession of arms. 
Recall that, as a result of his training, professional development, and service in 
combat, Corporal Sanchez came to construe his moral self as indexed exclusively to his 
identity as a soldier. For him, being a good person consists entirely in being a good 
soldier, which he further construes to mean a soldier who does not make mistakes. His 
personal identities, such as being a son, a friend, etc., are so compartmentalized and 
isolated that he no longer evaluates himself holistically. 
Since I am concerned with providing a model of character development that will 
ultimately help soldiers like Sanchez to overcome this kind of fragmentation, perhaps we 
need to find a single identity that is universal enough to unite one’s moral concerns—
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something like being American.
42
 I believe, however, that we will not make much 
progress in uniting the moral self by looking for an all-encompassing identity. We may, 
on the one hand, pick an identity that is not rich enough to unite all the others. On the 
other hand, we may simply add one more identity to the existing set. Instead of taking 
that approach, I want to consider a way to relate soldiers’ multiple identities (e.g. 
soldier, spouse, parent, etc.) to one another through their personal goals such that they 
constitute a united moral self.  
Virtue-Relevant Goals 
Following the lead of certain philosophers and moral psychologists, I argue for a “goal 
theory” approach for the integration of one’s identities into a united moral self.43  I 
contend that the development of one’s moral self, toward either fragmentation or 
integration, is related to one’s personal goals. If soldiers examine these goals, I believe 
that they can do two things that will help integrate their lives. First, to the extent that 
soldiers construe the moral salience of their goals, it is possible for soldiers to transform 
personal goals into moral goals. Second, soldiers can then broaden the scope of their 
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moral goals such that they bear upon each of their identities. In other words, goals are 
another important variable—like one’s construals of situations, and self-perceptions—
that influence one’s character development.44 
Furthermore, on a CAPS account, goals are a social cognitive unit. They can be 
part of one’s character traits. As is the case with other social cognitive units, external and 
internal stimuli can activate one’s goals. Like other mental states, beliefs for example, 
goals may not always be present to one’s awareness. Nevertheless, they are still active in 
one’s mind.45 Thus, soldiers can access their goals even if the mental representation of 
them is not front and center.
46
 In other words, goals can be active in their thinking even 
if they do not realize it. Automatic behavior, which is often required of soldiers in 
combat, is not only rational on this basis. It may also become habitually virtuous if the 
right construals, cognitive and affective patterns, and goals are in play. In this way, if 
soldiers align their goals with a holistic sense of self and regular construals of the moral 
salience of situations, then they can also begin to overcome fragmentation. 
In order to see how this works, consider the case of someone who is an Army 
officer and a parent. Thousands of men and women in the Army share these two 
identities. Within that group of people, many take these two identities to be in conflict 
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(hence fragmentation).
47
 One prominent retired officer whose story is featured in the 
movie We Were Soldiers, Lieutenant General Harold “Hal” Moore, rejected that view, 
and took these identities to be complementary. There are two scenes in the movie, one 
that I will consider now and the other later, which illustrate how Moore’s sense of self 
(i.e. his identities), his goals, and his construal of the events of each situation are 
interrelated in a unified way. 
In one particular scene, a young officer in Moore’s battalion who recently 
became a father asks then Lieutenant Colonel Moore a question. “What do you think 
about being a soldier and a father?” Moore replies, “I hope that being good at the one 
makes me better at the other.” Aside from the affection he shows toward this new officer 
and father, he conveys a point of view in this simple yet profound answer that is relevant 
to our discussion of character development. 
First, Moore takes his identities as father and soldier to be complementary, rather 
than compartmentalized and isolated from one another. There is no fragmentation here. 
Second, he aspires to be both the best soldier and the best father possible. In pursuing 
excellence as a soldier, he also pursues excellence as a father. This does not mean that 
being a good father necessarily follows from being a good soldier. If that were the case, 
fragmentation would not be the significant problem for soldiers that it is. Professional 
concepts would, after all, turn out to be sufficient for moral development. Rather, Moore 
construes that these goals have something in common—certain character traits like 
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compassion, empathy, patience, etc. that are constitutive of being a good father and a 
good soldier. In this way, they are properly called virtue-relevant goals.
48
 
Given this goal theory approach, we could say that one’s identity motivates the 
development of the moral self by steering virtue-relevant goals. Yet, we could also 
identify a reciprocal process at work here. The integration of one’s identity supervenes 
upon—occurs as a consequence of—one’s virtue-relevant goals and the perception that 
one is acting in a certain role in a given situation. What we can take away from this 
discussion of virtue-relevant goals is that soldiers must aspire to excellence in each 
domain and role of life. 
I believe that once soldiers commit to a more comprehensive sense of identity, 
one in which they see themselves as more than members of the profession of arms, they 
will realize that the Army Profession concepts are insufficient for their holistic 
development. The view I am championing demonstrates that identity steers the choices 
of virtue-relevant goals, which in turn motivates the development, as well as the 
integration, of one’s moral self. I hope to demonstrate the merits of this view in the two 
chapters that follow. For now, I hope to have shown how virtue-relevant goals serve to 
unite one’s moral self, and that soldiers ought to select virtue-relevant goals to facilitate 
both personal and professional development.
49
 As I turn now to my explanation of the 
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third and final part of my definition of the virtues, I will try to show how a united moral 
self contributes to human flourishing. 
Human Flourishing 
We have just seen how virtue-relevant goals contribute to character development. This 
picture of character development suggests that the value of the character traits that 
contribute to the development of one’s moral self is merely instrumental. In other words, 
one ought to pursue them because they are a means of obtaining other goods, e.g. being a 
good parent, spouse, etc. Prima facie this seems right. In addition, it strongly correlates 
with our emphasis on the importance of holistic development across the identities and 
domains of one’s life. It is, nevertheless, problematic.50  
The unique demands of military life, especially during an era of persistent 
conflict, often make it extremely difficult for soldiers to pursue goods external to the 
Army Profession. For example, a twelve month deployment limits a soldier’s ability to 
enjoy being a spouse and parent by separating him or her from loved ones at home. Even 
when a soldier returns home and reunites with his or her family, there is a lot of work to 
do to restore the intimacy that existed before the separation. To make matters more 
difficult, soldiers that return from deployment are oftentimes significantly different 
people due to the effects of combat.  
The changes that soldiers undergo as a result of combat may be physical, 
psychological, or both. Furthermore, these changes can permanently inhibit a soldier’s 
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ability to enjoy being a spouse, parent, etc. Imagine, for example, the case of a husband 
and father, David, who lost both arms as the result of being wounded in combat. He is no 
longer able to enjoy, in the way he used to, embracing and holding his wife and children. 
Additionally, consider the case of a daughter, Sarah, who is suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder. Before her deployment, she and her parents enjoyed each 
other’s company by getting out to do things in the city where she grew up. Now, when 
she visits home, she simply cannot enjoy spending time with her parents the way she 
used to—shopping, going to movies, concerts, etc.—because crowds of people make her 
feel anxious. 
The changes I have described clearly affect David and Sarah’s ability to enjoy 
what they previously perceived to be constitutive of human flourishing (i.e. hugging my 
kids, spending time with my parents). They also affect each of their senses of identity.
51
 
David is no longer the husband he used to be, and Sarah is not the same daughter. We 
must have some way of relating these changes to their virtue and the relationship 
between their virtue and human flourishing. 
Virtue theorists have traditionally held that the possession of virtue, while 
necessary for human flourishing, is not sufficient for human flourishing.
52
 Human beings 
need more than virtue to live well. They also need things like friendship, money, shelter, 
and food. Moreover, our cultivation of virtue does not guarantee that we will secure the 
type of good life we hoped to live, nor does it mean that such a life will always be 
available to us. Whereas David and Sarah can still flourish if they continue to cultivate 
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their virtue, the good lives they can live will no longer consist of hugs, nights on the 
town, etc. As I shall argue below, this is an important resource for soldiers who return 
home from combat with various injuries (mental, physical, emotional, etc.) to keep in 
mind as they try to find new ways of living a good life. 
Aside from their contribution to one’s enjoyment of certain goods like being a 
parent or spouse, virtues also have intrinsic value. Soldiers like David and Sarah can live 
well by cultivating virtue even if they do not possess the goods they had construed as 
constitutive of the good life. In this sense, flourishing is not some state that one hopes to, 
but may not ever, reach in the future. It is a continuously present end for those who 
pursue virtue-relevant goals.
53
 As I showed in my discussion of virtue-relevant goals in 
the previous section, one’s pursuit of these goals also serves to unite one’s moral self. 
This unity is also an intrinsic good.
 54
 To have a united moral self is necessary to live 
well, even if one is constrained in the exercise of any particular role or identity. Such a 
view of human flourishing could help mitigate the frustration, discouragement, or 
despair that accompanies the irreversible life changes I mentioned above. It could help 
soldiers redefine what they take the good life to be. This view could also help soldiers 
see the routine challenges that come with life in the Army as opportunities to cultivate 
virtues, like patience, that are intrinsically good rather than as obstacles to living the 
good life. 
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In what I have just said about the intrinsic value of virtues, I do not mean to 
suggest that flourishing in the Army is simply a matter of seeing the good in each 
situation because it is an opportunity to build character. It is not good, as we saw with 
General Sinclair, for soldiers to be away from their families for years at a time. 
Furthermore, the loss of one’s limbs, eyesight, or mental and emotional health is tragic. 
These things make certain goods and certain ways of flourishing unobtainable. Yet, what 
I want to demonstrate is that soldiers can still live well when things go badly. If certain 
goods are no longer available to them, then soldiers can identify and pursue other goods 
that are realizable. This view of human flourishing—one that accounts for the unique 
circumstances, challenges, expectations, abilities, etc. of each individual—should inform 
and serve as the goal of the Army’s character development program. 
Further Considerations 
I have set forth my definition of the virtues as it relates to character development. In the 
previous section I considered the instrumental and intrinsic value of the virtues and how 
that relates to human flourishing. Yet, it is not entirely clear whether soldiers should 
cultivate the same or a different set of virtues as their civilian counterparts or whether 
the sense of the virtues differs between soldiers and civilians. For example, many 
civilians would see the relevance of cultivating compassion. Soldiers might, however, 
construe compassion as a trait that hinders their ability to kill the enemy. Likewise, they 
could construe loyalty to refer to two different kinds of character traits—one for soldiers 
and one for civilians. Let us now turn to address this additional consideration. 
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I contend that the range and kind of virtues soldiers ought to cultivate are the 
same as those that civilians ought to cultivate. There are no exceptional military virtues. 
The domain of military service does not pick out a conceptually distinct set of virtues, 
but rather provides a unique context in which soldiers can aspire to cultivate virtues they 
share in common with civilians in a more global way.
55
 
Given the many domains in a soldier’s life, it may be challenging for soldiers to 
cultivate consistently a particular virtue in each domain. This challenge is made even 
greater for soldiers because military life, especially during an era of persistent conflict, 
can be radically different from civilian life. Nevertheless, I contend that military service 
should not limit the range of virtues or redefine them for soldiers. Instead, I believe that 
the contexts of military life, and especially those constitutive of combat, provide 
opportunities for soldiers to make certain traits more global. To see how this can happen 
in a way that unites one’s moral self, let us briefly return to Hal Moore and his aspiration 
to be a good father and a good soldier. 
In Moore’s mind, being a good soldier and a good father entails, among other 
things, showing compassion to his children and to his soldiers. Although the contexts 
differ, Moore perceives the situations in each context to elicit the same character trait(s). 
The features of the situations that make up each context, while objectively different, do 
not look all that different to Moore. Instead, he perceives that each context calls for him 
to show compassion to others. For instance, during a scene when Moore is up late 
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preparing to lead his men into combat in Vietnam, his wife, Julie, enters the room where 
he is working. 
Julie: Can't sleep? 
Hal: Ah, the men are so young, and now they sent me a new crop even 
greener. When I look at them, I... see our boys. 
Julie: Well, then, you're just the man to lead them. 
Hal: I guess. 
 
In speaking about his soldiers and his boys as he does, Moore takes both groups to be 
vulnerable, and in need of his leadership and care. In this regard, Moore seems to 
recognize a substantial similarity in the way he is called to care for them. The 
compassion that Moore has for his boys is the same kind of compassion he has for his 
soldiers. We see in his story an example of a united moral self, the goal of my 
understanding of the relationship between the virtues and character development. 
Moore’s example inspired the men he led, and should inspire soldiers today. This, I 
believe, is difficult for soldiers in today’s Army, because of the Army’s nearly exclusive 
emphasis on professionalism. Character development conceived of as professionalism is 
not sufficient to develop soldiers into people like Hal Moore. Rather, it is likely to 
produce fragmented people like General Sinclair and Corporal Sanchez. 
In the next chapter, I will return again to Sanchez’s story. We have already 
examined the social learning history and patterns of interpretation that have contributed 
to the fragmentation of his moral self. The Sanchez who returns from Iraq is clearly in 
need of care. In what follows, I want to look at the type of care he is likely to receive as 
a soldier, because it raises further problems in the Army’s approach to character 
development. In so doing, I aim to show that there is a conceptual fragmentation that 
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leads to a fragmented approach to soldiers’ overall development. I will not only identify 
the problems with the Army’s approach, but will extend my account of character 
development to include the role of the emotions. Thus, I will also consider how other 
approaches to moral development from the history of philosophy have treated the 
emotions for the purpose of gathering additional resources to use in the model I will 
present in the final chapter of my thesis.  
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CHAPTER III 
CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT, THE EMOTIONS, AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
As I have shown in the previous two chapters, the Army and virtue ethics share a 
common goal for moral development: the cultivation of virtues toward a unified moral 
self. In the previous chapter, we saw that there are good empirical reasons to believe that 
virtues are character traits understood as cognitive-affective processing systems. We saw 
that human beings naturally interpret the situations, either mental states or the 
circumstances of life, in which they find themselves. People can develop new 
interpretive patterns or alter existing ones in order to steer the development of these 
systems through the transformation of their goals and sense of identity. Furthermore, 
one’s emotional responses throughout the entirety of this process reinforce patterns of 
interpretation and, thus, the cultivation of certain traits. 
As this view of moral development suggests, human beings are not only 
cognitive creatures, that is, creatures that think, believe, perceive, and aspire toward 
certain things. They are also affective, or emotional, creatures that feel certain ways 
about life and their place in it. On a CAPS account, these feelings play a significant role 
in the cultivation of virtue. Yet, in addition to the empirical account that the CAPS story 
provides for this view of the emotions and moral development, there is a substantial 
amount of evidence in the historical record that shows that other philosophers have 
assigned an important role to the emotions in their accounts of moral development. 
These precedents, therefore, give good reasons to suppose that any model for character 
development in the Army should account for the emotional nature of human beings. 
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Thus, in this chapter, I would like to examine in further detail the role of the emotions in 
the character development of soldiers like Corporal Sanchez. 
In the sections that follow, I will trace a few examples from history where 
philosophers addressed moral development in terms of the relationship between people’s 
perception of the world and their emotional responses. Given the ways in which these 
responses can become habitual for human beings, I contend that people need assistance 
from others (i.e. positive social influence) to identify and overcome habitual ways of 
seeing and reacting that may contribute to their fragmentation. Regarding social 
influence in the Army, I will return to Sanchez’s story and consider the type of care he 
could expect to receive from others for his feelings of guilt. I propose that the response 
he is likely to receive is inadequate and highlights a further conceptual fragmentation 
between professionalism and resilience in the Army’s approach to a soldier’s overall 
development. I aim to demonstrate this by taking a closer look at the concepts that 
constitute the Army Profession campaign and the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness 
program. In so doing, I will raise a further concern about the reliance these programs 
have upon subject matter experts who train and teach others. All things considered, I 
contend that these programs provide inadequate resources and practices to develop good 
soldiers. In response to these shortcomings, I propose the Army should design a new 
approach to character development. 
Emotions, Character Development and the History of Philosophy 
As I have suggested thus far, integrating an account of the emotions is necessary for any 
model of moral development. The empirical work of social psychologists like Mischel 
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and Shoda demonstrates this. Yet, philosophers in the past have argued for the same 
thing. As we consider their views, I hope we will see that the integration of ethics and 
emotion is not the novel suggestion of a few contemporary philosophers and 
psychologists. I also hope to show that their views are consistent with my own view that 
the Army will have better resources for identifying and overcoming fragmentation in 
soldiers’ lives by including the emotions in its model for character development. The 
particular resource I have in mind is a clearer understanding of how one’s construal of 
oneself and the features of various situations relate to one’s emotions. 
Aristotle, the Stoics, and Augustine view the emotions as a product of one’s 
construal of value. Yet, in spite of this agreement as to the relationship between 
construal and emotion, each philosopher takes a different view of whether one ought to 
shape or suppress the emotions in the cultivation of virtue. As I present each 
philosopher’s view, I will do so by addressing a particular emotion that all three discuss. 
That emotion is grief, one which is of great relevance in the development of soldiers like 
Sanchez.  
Although prior to now I have not specifically addressed Sanchez’s grief over 
killing an innocent boy, it is clear that he construes this to be a great loss while he holds 
himself responsible. Thus, grief and guilt are closely related to one another in Sanchez’s 
experience, as they are in the experience of some soldiers who mourn the loss of friends 
in combat and feel guilty for having survived. In the discussion that follows, I will try to 
give some insight into caring for soldiers who experience the loss of someone or 
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something valuable in combat by surveying how these philosophers addressed the 
relationship between grief and virtue. 
Aristotle views emotion as the product of value judgment. In other words, 
Aristotle believes that there is a proper place for emotion in an adequate account of 
virtue, and that the emotions are a necessary component of virtue. Consider the 
following from Aristotle’s account in the Nicomachean Ethics: 
I am talking here about virtue of character, since it is this that is 
concerned with feelings and actions, and it is in these that we find excess, 
deficiency and the mean. For example, fear, confidence, appetite, anger, 
pity, and in general pleasure and pain can be experienced too much or too 
little, and in both ways not well. But to have them at the right time, about 
the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the 
right way, is the mean and best; and this is the business of virtue.
56
 
 
According to Aristotle, emotions are a necessary component of virtue in that virtue “hits 
a mean,” not only with respect to actions, but also with respect to feelings. One cannot 
be virtuous without exercising both action and feeling. He lists pity among the feelings 
that one should have at the right time, about the right things, towards the right people, 
for the right end, and in the right way. Elsewhere, in the Poetics, Aristotle illustrates how 
tragic theater can arouse pity toward characters in the play, toward the rightful goal of 
managing grief.
57
 
A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action that is serious and also, as 
having magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable 
accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts of the work; in a 
dramatic, not in a narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, 
wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions.
58
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Showing pity toward others, even though they are actors in a play, is a way of hitting a 
mean with respect to one’s own grief. Richard Sorabji describes Aristotle’s concept this 
way: 
The idea will be that we come into the theatre with too much grief, not 
pity. But by arousing pity in the theatre we subject to catharsis not only 
the newly aroused pity but also the original grief… His idea is that by 
increasing pity, tragedy reduces not some antecedent pity, but antecedent 
grief.
59
 
 
As Sorabji points out in this comment, Aristotle did not believe that people should 
suppress every emotion they experience. Rather, they ought to employ the right 
emotions at the right time in order to shape other emotions that overwhelm them. 
We have already seen how the overwhelming guilt that Sanchez feels contributes 
to the fragmentation of his moral self. He cannot see himself as a good person, even 
though the Army tells him that he is a good soldier. Emotions are a powerful influence 
over the integration or fragmentation of soldiers’ lives. In light of Aristotle’s views on 
tragic theater, and the ways in which emotions interact with other emotions, one can 
think of the cathartic effect that well-produced movies like We Were Soldiers or Saving 
Private Ryan have had on veterans.
60
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Moreover, Aristotle makes it clear that one will necessarily grieve if one 
construes the object lost to have worth with respect to one’s flourishing.61 At the end of 
the chapter, I will consider how the relationship between emotion and human flourishing 
helps us understand the fragmentation of Sanchez’s life. Before doing so, however, I 
want to consider another account of the emotions that looks differently at the value of 
goods external to one’s own virtue. The Stoics agree with Aristotle that grief results 
from the construal that one has lost something of value. They disagree that external 
goods hold any true worth. I turn to their view next. 
 According to the Stoics, one ought to eliminate grief by rejecting the perception 
that anything external to one’s own virtue is of value. Grief is the result of a bad 
interpretation, a misconstrual like, “I have lost someone of great value to me.”62 Cicero 
summarizes Stoic thinking by describing three steps to follow to help others cope with 
grief. 
The first remedial step therefore in giving comfort will be to show that 
either there is no great evil or very little; the second will be to discuss the 
common lot of life and any special feature that needs discussion in the lot 
of the individual mourner; the third will be to show that it is utter folly to 
                                                 
61
 Nussbaum argues that the intrinsic worth of something lost and its worth in a person’s life are essential 
components of a proper value judgment: “What inspires grief is the death of someone beloved, someone 
who has been an important part of one’s own life. This does not mean that the emotions view these objects 
simply as tools or instruments of the agent’s own satisfaction: they may be invested with intrinsic worth or 
value, as indeed my mother surely was. They may be loved for their own sake, and their good sought for 
its own sake. But what makes the emotion center around this particular mother, among all the many 
wonderful people and mothers in the world, is that she is my mother, a part of my life… The notion of loss 
that is central to grief itself has this double aspect: it alludes to the value of the person who has left or died, 
but it alludes as well to that person’s relation to the perspective of the mourner” (Nussbaum, Upheavals of 
Thought, 31). 
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 The Stoics believe that nothing should be comparatively more valuable than one’s own virtue, because 
one’s virtue is the only thing that he or she can control. I cannot control the circumstance of my life, but I 
can control what I think, and how I perceive my life. 
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be uselessly overcome by sorrow when one realizes that there is no 
possible advantage.
63
 
 
On this view, the mourner should first change his interpretation, since there is nothing 
that is very evil in losing someone. Next, the mourner should recognize that he is not 
alone in losing someone. This is the “common lot of life.” Finally, the mourner must see 
that there is no advantage to being overcome with grief, expressing sorrow, shedding 
tears, etc. 
While the Stoics capture well the relationship between construal and emotion, I 
find their conclusions difficult to accept. To perceive that no great evil has happened, for 
example, in the loss of a friend seems to devalue the worth of one’s friend. The 
suppression of emotion that the Stoics champion may seem to have some appeal to 
soldiers who must cope with the loss of friends in combat. Yet, I have seen in my own 
experience that it is better for soldiers to express their grief.
64
 In so doing, they honor the 
friends they have lost, and start to heal the emotional wound. 
Augustine has a perspective on how one ought to view the loss of a friend that is 
similar to the one I have just described. Consider this excerpt from the The City of God. 
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 Nancy Sherman gives an excellent account of the implications of Stoic thought for character 
development in the Army in her book Stoic Warriors. Consider her description of the tension between 
soldiers’ desire, on the one hand, to grieve and, on the other hand, to suppress it: “Emotionally, fighting 
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developing an attachment to others brings with it a vulnerability to their loss. The Stoics urge, in their 
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profound and lasting grief. The Stoic ideal can resonate deeply with warriors who must continue with 
missions amid carnage and devastation, and who have learned, often too well, to stave off grief and its 
expression.” Nancy Sherman, Stoic Warriors, 133. 
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This also we could not hear without pain: for if their life delighted us with 
the solace of friendship, how could it be that their death should not bring 
us grief? Anyone who forbids such grief must forbid, if he can, all 
friendly conversation: he must prohibit or extinguish affection; he must 
with ruthless disregard sever the ties of all human companionship, or else 
stipulate that such companionship must merely be made use of, without 
giving rise to any delight of soul. But if this can in no way be done, how 
can the death of one whose life has been sweet to us not bring us 
bitterness? …The life of mortal men, then, is afflicted, sometimes more 
lightly, but sometimes more harshly, by the death of those whom we love 
most dearly; and this is especially true of those who discharge duties 
which are necessary for human society.
65
 
 
In this passage, Augustine takes up the possibility of losing a friend, and argues that 
grief is a proper response. He seems to have the Stoics in mind when he states that those 
who forbid grief must also forbid any form of friendship more than what is merely 
necessary to accomplish a collective task.
66
 
 Aristotle, the Stoics, and Augustine give rich accounts of what grief is, and how 
to manage it. Unlike the Army’s current character development program, the views that 
these philosophers championed, although different, did not altogether ignore the role that 
                                                 
65
 Augustine, The City of God, ed. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
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 Augustine knew what it meant to lose a dear friend and he described that experience in his Confessions: 
“Everything was an object of horror, even light itself; all that was not he made me feel sick and was 
repulsive—except for groaning and tears. In them alone was there some slight relief. But when my 
weeping stopped, my soul felt burdened by a vast load of misery… The reason why that grief had 
penetrated me so easily and deeply was that I had poured out my soul on to the sand by loving a person 
sure to die as if he would never die.” Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford, U.K.: 
Oxford University Press, 2008): 59-60. While Augustine is clear as to the moderate catharsis of his grief 
and weeping, one hears some faint echoes of Stoic thought in the last sentence of this quote. Augustine 
acknowledges that the source of his sorrow was his own misinterpretation of the importance of his friend. 
He loved him as though he would never die. And, this was a false judgment. While this may appear to 
contradict Augustine’s thoughts in The City of God about the deep value of a friend, Augustine’s 
comments in the Confessions must be seen in the context of Augustine’s larger project. His mistake in 
loving his friend was not that he loved him deeply, but that he loved him exclusively. In other words, 
Augustine showed the kind of love to his friend that he should have only shown to God. This does not 
mean that Augustine thinks he should not love others at all, just that he should not love them more than 
God. 
 
  
51 
 
the emotions play. Their accounts of grief show us that one’s construal of a situation 
results in an emotional state, which one ought to steer or suppress in order to cultivate 
virtue. I believe that Aristotle and Augustine were correct to argue that the construals 
that human beings make relate directly to their emotions, and are a necessary component 
of virtue. Their ideas should inform our program for character development in the Army, 
and inspire soldiers to develop interpretive patterns that will help them to steer their 
emotions in a virtuous way. 
The Army has neglected to give an account of the emotions in its current 
approach to character development, however, by exclusively promoting professionalism 
in the Army Profession campaign. As it stands, the Army approaches the emotions in a 
single program, the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program, which is 
conceptually and organizationally isolated from the Army Profession campaign. In so 
doing, the Army has created a theoretical and practical rift between professional ethics, 
captured in the Army Profession campaign, and emotional fitness or resilience, captured 
in the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program.  
The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program and Emotional Fitness 
The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program properly identifies emotions as the 
product of one’s construal of a situation. Consider the following example that it provides 
in its model for cultivating emotional fitness. 
When driving his kid to school, Sergeant Smith became irritated when he 
got behind a slow-moving school bus that made many, many stops… 
Your mind plays a major role in your emotional responses to events. In 
our example, what do you think the real parts and the perceived parts are? 
The reality was that the school bus DID stop frequently. The perception 
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involved the thoughts about what was happening. For example, you might 
naturally make up motives that the driver had, such as that he was driving 
extra slow on purpose. You may or may not be correct about that, but 
those are your thoughts contributing to your feelings. The fact is that, 
once the emotion of irritation arises, you have already had the thoughts to 
view the situation in a particular way. Some people may have noticed the 
frequent stops, but would not have interpreted the situation as irritating, 
and some people may have welcomed the delay as an opportunity to 
collect their thoughts on the way to work. The reality is the same in all 
cases, but your mind plays a role in your emotional response (or non-
response) to momentary situations.
67
 
 
The view that this example illustrates, that emotions are the product of one’s 
interpretation, is a step in the right direction for resilience training in the Army. The 
Army, however, has not incorporated this view into its model for character development. 
For some reason, the Army Profession campaign does not associate character 
development with cultivating fitness in the emotional, social, family, physical and 
spiritual domains of soldiers’ lives. Instead, the campaign encourages soldiers to see 
these as matters that belong to their resilience, which in the last several years has meant 
their recovery from combat. Furthermore, the Army program that does address fitness in 
these five domains, the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program, does not approach them 
as constitutive of character development. So, what one finds is a conceptual 
fragmentation between character development, which speaks to professionalism, and 
resilience, which speaks to emotion, etc. This conceptual fragmentation leads to a 
fragmented approach to a soldier’s overall development. This can be seen in the type of 
response Corporal Sanchez could expect to receive, if he divulged his emotional 
struggles to his friends or his squad leader. 
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When Corporal Sanchez tells his friends or squad leader that he is overcome with 
guilt for killing an innocent child at a check point, they will likely send him elsewhere 
for help.
 68
 They might refer Sanchez to their unit chaplain, a doctor, or psychologist. We 
should note that these referrals require Sanchez to seek help from those who are not 
normally his friends or mentors. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, Sanchez 
would not normally perceive these caregivers as professional soldiers. From Sanchez’s 
perspective, he leaves the professional domain even when he talks to an Army chaplain, 
doctor, or psychologist. In his counseling sessions with them, Sanchez would likely 
believe that he is not receiving professional development, but some kind of emotional or 
psychological first aid. Like a soldier healing from a gunshot wound, Sanchez (as well as 
his friends and leaders) would probably perceive that he is convalescing for a period of 
time until he can return to the real work of a professional soldier.
69
 
 It seems that at least one significant problem with this model is the fact that 
Corporal Sanchez and those who know him best (and could provide the most consistent 
care for him) do not see the type of care he receives as a function of professional, let 
alone moral, development.  Emotional concerns, they will at least implicitly contend, fall 
outside of the domain and expertise of professional soldiering. Indeed, professionals who 
are not really professional soldiers are the ones who can help Corporal Sanchez with his 
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emotions, for they only have the resources to do so.
70
 Therefore, they would argue, we 
must send Corporal Sanchez to such a professional.  
I believe that although it often is true that leaders and friends of soldiers do not 
have the resources to help soldiers like Corporal Sanchez, it simply is false to support, 
even if only implicitly, that emotional concerns are not constitutive to the moral 
development of good soldiers. All of the domains of a soldier’s fitness are relevant to the 
shape of their character and the actions that are a product of their character. Therefore, 
soldiers like Corporal Sanchez need a more holistic and integrated view of what it means 
to be soldier. They must not think that a good soldier simply is a professional soldier in 
the sense that the Army Profession campaign suggests. This simply is not true. Rather, a 
good soldier is one who has developed and continues to develop as a whole person. So 
when soldiers experience emotional turmoil like Corporal Sanchez, they need to 
recognize that the emotional challenges that they face from war do impact both their 
professional and personal domains. Strictly receiving “professional” development will 
not be enough for them. Nor will it be enough if they receive help for their personal lives 
without seeing how it relates to their professional activities. The Army could avoid both 
of these shortcomings if it incorporated the strengths of the Comprehensive Soldier 
Fitness program in its model for character development. Furthermore, such integration is 
in keeping with the Army’s commitment to virtue ethics, which, as we have seen, 
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recognizes that human beings are self-perceptive, interpretive creatures whose emotions 
often attend their views of themselves and the world. 
At the same time, we would do well to consider how challenging it might be for 
people to identify and assess for themselves the patterns of interpretation that lead them 
to react with certain emotions. As we saw in the previous chapter, the patterns of 
interpretation that human beings develop can make certain emotions, like guilt in 
Sanchez’s case, more global and habitual. 
In her account of virtue as social intelligence, Nancy Snow describes how these 
habits form, for example, in the case of an irritable woman. 
Sometimes, perhaps often, the process by which traits become 
generalized across situation-types is not salient to the agent. In other 
words, it is possible that our irritable woman has become that way 
without really noticing how entrenched and pervasive that trait has 
become, how deeply and prominently a part of her personality it is. Being 
irritable has become habitual for her—an automatic or nonconscious way 
in which she perceives and reacts to the world.
71
 
As Snow points out, it may often be the case that people are not aware of the emotions 
that they regularly exhibit as a result of perceiving the world in a consistent manner. 
This suggests that they need someone else to point out those emotional habits to them. 
Snow goes on to say the following. 
Suppose that one day our irritable woman is told by a friend, “You really 
have become an angry person. You don’t like anything or anyone.” 
Reflecting on these comments, the irritable one realizes their truth. She 
does not like this fact about herself. She resolves to change, begins 
observing when she becomes irritable, and starts asking herself why.
72
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This case is quite matter of fact. As Snow tells the story, a friend tells the irritable 
woman that she is an angry person, and the woman resolves to change this distasteful 
habit. Other cases may not go so well. People might just as easily resist the observations 
that others share about their personality, and deny that they have such shortcomings. 
While there is no way to guarantee that people will respond well to constructive 
criticism, I suggest that those whom people trust and respect are in the best position to 
assist with their development along these lines. This is something I will develop further 
in the next chapter. For now, I hope to have shown that once we incorporate more and 
more things—like the emotions—into an account of soldiers’ character development, we 
will need to consider how social influence relates to the success that soldiers have in 
working out their emotions, etc. in their day to day lives. 
Social Influence and Character Development in the Army 
As I have stated previously, I believe character development in the Army should include 
more than learning the principles of a professional ethic. Rather, it should consist in the 
integration of soldiers’ professional and personal moral selves. Furthermore, it should 
include, among other things, an understanding of one’s emotions and how they relate to 
virtue. Keeping all of these things in mind is not an easy task for anyone who seeks to 
cultivate virtue. In this section, I want to begin to consider the role that others play (i.e. 
social influence) in our moral development, what that looks like in the Army’s current 
professional development and resilience programs, and whether we ought to improve its 
approach in these areas. 
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In her essay, “Authority in Morals,” Elizabeth Anscombe presents a view of 
moral development that suggests the need we have for others to assist us in cultivating 
virtue. On her view, moral development requires more than believing certain moral 
principles to be true. Consider the comparison she makes between moral development 
and learning mathematics in the following passage. 
One does not learn mathematics, I said, by learning that certain 
propositions—mathematical ones—are true, but by working out their 
proofs. Similarly one does not learn morality by learning that certain 
propositions—ethical ones—are true, but by learning what to do or 
abstain from in particular situations and getting by practice to do certain 
things, and abstain from others.
73
 
 
According to Anscombe, moral development requires one to work out moral principles 
by applying them to different situations. Moreover, on her account, the role of the 
teacher in moral development is much larger than simply telling students that certain 
things are true. Her view calls for something like a mentorship model rather than a 
reliance upon subject matter experts, something I have not seen the Army practice when 
it comes to soldiers’ overall development. On the contrary, both the Army Profession 
campaign and the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program emphasize the role that 
subject matter experts (MAPET and MRT certified) play in achieving the desired 
outcomes of each program. 
As I have already shown, outsourcing a vital component of character 
development like emotional fitness to other “professionals” is problematic. Soldiers are 
not likely to construe these providers as credible because they do not share similar 
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backgrounds. In other words, before soldiers can commend themselves to the care of 
another, they want some assurance that the principles and practices they learn will 
actually map onto their experiences as soldiers in the profession of arms. Yet as things 
stand, experts play a role not only in the treatment of soldiers’ spiritual, mental and 
emotional health by chaplains, doctors, psychologists, etc. Subject matter experts, i.e. 
MAPET and MRT certified trainers, play a central role when it comes to teaching moral 
principles (i.e. professionalism), and principles of resiliency in both the Army Profession 
campaign and the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program. This reliance upon experts in 
teaching these principles, as I hope to show in the section that follows, only exacerbates 
the problems with the Army’s current approach to character development. 
Moral Authority in the Army 
Turning back to Anscombe’s essay, we see that she also takes up a concern about the 
role that authorities (e.g. teachers, experts, etc.) play in moral development. Her concern 
follows from the distinction she makes between authority over action, which entails 
obedience, and authority over thoughts, principles, etc., which entails belief. Consider 
the following passage where she distinguishes between obedience and belief in response 
to authority. 
The difference lies in this: that the one with authority over what you do, 
can decide, within limits, what you shall do; his decision is what makes it 
right for you to do what he says—if the reproach against you, when you 
disobey him, is only that of disobedience. But someone with authority 
over what you think is not at liberty, within limits, to decide what you 
shall think among the range of possible thoughts on a given matter; what 
makes it right for you to think, given that it is your business to form a 
judgment at all, is simply that it is true, and no decision can make 
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something a true thing for you to think, as the decision of someone in 
authority can make something a good thing for you to do.
74
 
According to Anscombe, the right kind of reason for believing an authority’s testimony 
is not that the authority says, “Believe this.” Rather, the right kind of reason for 
believing an authority’s testimony is that his or her testimony is in fact true. This 
generally seems right, and I would like to extend Anscombe’s account to address a 
problem I have observed in the Army’s general approach to training and education. 
In situations where someone in authority (i.e. an expert) teaches soldiers in Army 
education programs, soldiers often misconstrue that the instructor is exercising the same 
kind of authority with respect to what they should believe as someone who has authority 
over them with respect to what they should do. As we have seen from Anscombe’s 
paper, telling soldiers to do something and telling them that something is true have 
completely different aims—action in the case of the former, and belief in the case of the 
latter.
75
 The nature of authority in the Army, however, and the life and death matters 
often at stake in soldiers’ training make it more difficult for them to distinguish between 
authority over action and authority over belief. This is due in large part to the social 
learning history that is typical of those who serve in the Army—something I have 
already explored in Sanchez’s case, but which deserves further attention. Thus, I now 
turn to consider how this social learning history may lead Sanchez and other soldiers to 
misconstrue the social influence that others have in Army training and education. Later, I 
                                                 
74
 Anscombe, “Authority in Morals,” 3:44. 
75
 See also R.B. Friedman, “On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy” in Authority, ed. Joseph 
Raz (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 56-91. 
  
60 
 
will consider how this inhibits cultivating, among other things, the right emotions that 
serve soldiers’ overall development. 
During a soldier’s initial entry training (i.e. basic training), drill sergeants teach 
their soldiers certain tactical and technical facts like, for example, the maximum 
effective range of an M-4 rifle is 500 meters. The fact that new soldiers learn these and 
other facts from those who have authority over their every action can blur, in their view, 
the distinction between obedience and belief. 
In basic training, any hesitation to act in response to a drill sergeant’s command 
is met with some form of punishment, e.g. getting yelled at, doing pushups, losing a 
privilege, etc. Soldiers soon realize that things will go badly for them if their drill 
sergeants perceive something as reticence, or worse, a challenge to their authority. In 
reality, given the conceptual distinction I have presented between obedience and belief, 
it is impossible for drill sergeants to punish soldiers for holding certain, unexpressed 
beliefs. Yet, I find it to be true that soldiers fear the appearance of insubordination that 
comes from questioning or critiquing the statements an authority makes on a given topic. 
Thus, they often refrain from asking the types of questions or responding in ways aimed 
to further investigate whether what the authority is telling them is true, and how it 
applies to their experiences as soldiers. 
Thinking critically about the maximum effective range of an M-4 and many other 
tactical and technical details may seem unnecessary.
76
 There are, however, more abstract 
concepts, for instance those contained in the Soldier’s Creed, which those in authority 
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teach to soldiers.
77
 Some amount of critical thinking and discussion seems absolutely 
necessary in those cases, inasmuch as they make claims about one’s identity and values. 
Yet, it is very likely that soldiers will construe their future training and education 
environments to be similar to those in the past where those in authority inhibited any 
critical discussion of the topic. This is problematic, because without some amount of 
critical thinking and discussion it seems unlikely that soldiers will even know what these 
concepts mean, whether they are worthy of belief, and how plausible it is to apply them 
to their lives as soldiers. 
Furthermore, much if not all of the Army’s training and education is aimed at 
preparation for war. This additional feature of soldiers’ social learning history tends to 
make it difficult for them to weigh the relative importance of different facts, concepts, 
etc., or explore their broader applications. Instructors often treat every topic they teach 
as crucial to mission success in a combat environment.
78
 The life and death stakes that 
those in authority place on the topics they teach can lead soldiers to construe that they 
ought to believe whatever someone in a position of authority tells them. Thus, in light of 
this social learning history, I propose that students in Army training and education 
programs do not learn, retain, or apply the instruction they receive from various subject 
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matter experts as much as they might through other means.
79
 This has significant 
implications for character development in the Army. 
I contend that insofar as the Army Profession campaign relies upon experts to 
train soldiers, this will inhibit critical thinking and discussion of whether its focus on 
professionalism is problematic. For example, it is likely that those who teach the 
MAPET course or other Army Profession training will not ask their students to consider, 
as I have in this thesis, whether professionalism is sufficient for character development. 
Nor, will they ask for them to think of other features of our lives as human beings that 
may relate to our development. 
We saw earlier in this chapter that there are compelling reasons to incorporate an 
account of the emotions into moral development. Throughout this chapter, we have also 
seen the significant role that our perceptions of ourselves, others, and the world play in 
shaping our emotions and cultivating virtue. It is highly unlikely that subject matter 
experts who are steeped in professional concepts will relate these other features that 
constitute what it means to be a human being to soldiers’ character development. Nor, do 
they have the time to help soldiers work out professional concepts in the specific 
circumstances of their lives. Instead, those who are experts in professional concepts will 
aim to train as many soldiers as possible to be able to recall the principles of each 
program, much like they would recall the maximum effective range of an M-4 rifle. 
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Army Profession Concepts and Construal in the Life of Corporal Sanchez 
As I close this chapter, I want to consider what it will mean for Corporal Sanchez, aside 
from the counseling he receives, to attend a series of classes on professionalism (which 
he will according to the Army Profession campaign’s plan for ethics training during 
2013). It is noteworthy that the “experts” who both counsel, and train him in 
professional ethics, will be Army chaplains. I have already mentioned the problems (e.g. 
level of trust, credibility, etc.) this creates. I will say more in the next chapter about a 
more promising role for chaplains in soldiers’ character development. For now, I 
propose that Sanchez’s training in professional concepts will only reinforce his guilt, and 
make it more difficult for him to see himself as a good person. 
As he receives this training, Sanchez will learn, for example, the Army 
Profession concept of military expertise. 
Our military expertise as a profession is the design, generation, support, 
and ethical application of landpower. This is our contribution to the 
defense of our Nation. Our professional responsibility is to continually 
advance our expert knowledge and skills in landpower and certify every 
Army professional. Lifelong learning is required of all Army 
professionals. Army professionals must continuously develop expertise in 
each of these four fields: 
 
1. Military – Technical: How the Army applies landpower to accomplish 
the mission. 
2. Moral – Ethical: How the Army accomplishes the mission in the right 
way. 
3. Political – Cultural: How the Army understands and operates in a 
multi-cultural, complex world. 
4. Human Development: How the Army recruits, develops, and inspires 
Army professionals.
80
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It is hard to know exactly what Sanchez will do with the ideas that constitute this 
professional concept. In the training I have received on this concept, the chaplain who 
conducted the training did not say anything about what it means to develop expertise in 
the moral-ethical field. Given Sanchez’s social learning history and his belief of what it 
means to be morally upright, he may likely conclude that by killing an innocent boy he 
also failed to be an expert in the military-technical and moral-ethical senses.
81
 
 All things considered, it seems like Sanchez is in trouble. The experts who are 
supposed to help him become a better soldier simply do not have the conceptual 
resources or practices necessary for him to develop in a holistic way. Moreover, what 
these experts, most of them chaplains, have to offer actually hinders Sanchez’s 
development and further fragments his moral self. 
The Army’s theory and method for character development are seriously flawed. I 
propose, therefore, that the Army redesign its approach. In the chapter that follows, I 
propose an alternative model for character development that integrates the Army’s 
current programs, redefines the role of subject matter experts, and incorporates the 
interpersonal relationships that exist among leaders, soldiers, and friends. Thus, in my 
model, I will make use of the strengths and resources of the Army’s current force 
structure, as well as the MAPET and MRT systems. I also give significant attention to 
the role of the chaplain in character development. In so doing, I propose that chaplains 
serve as mentors, rather than instructors in professional ethics, for leaders and friends 
who can help fellow soldiers aspire to virtuous living. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HOLISTIC CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARMY 
We have seen that fragmentation is a serious problem for soldiers. It is a problem that 
the Army’s current program for moral development, the Army Profession campaign, has 
not taken into account. The Army Profession campaign stresses the need for soldiers to 
identify themselves as professionals. Yet, as the recent moral failures of several general 
officers as well as the tragic circumstances of Corporal Sanchez’s life demonstrate, 
professional concepts are insufficient for character development, and can exacerbate the 
problem of fragmentation. Thus, the Army should gather additional resources and 
practices that extend character development beyond the professional domain in order to 
mitigate fragmentation. 
My method over the last two chapters has been to take inventory of some of the 
necessary conceptual resources and practices to begin the construction of a model for 
holistic character development in the Army. When I talked about character and virtue, I 
did so with the aim that soldiers reflect upon who they are and who they want to be. This 
calls for a sense of self that recognizes the multiple identities that they possess (e.g. 
professional and personal). It also requires some means to relate those multiple identities 
with each other in order to develop united moral selves. Thus, I also suggested that 
soldiers use self-reflection to select virtue-relevant goals—goals pertaining to the 
content of certain virtues—in a manner that unites their identities and begins to mitigate 
fragmentation. Furthermore, since human beings are emotional as well as cognitive 
creatures, there is reason to believe that the emotions play a significant role in their 
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holistic development. Thus, any moral development program must also include an 
account of the emotions. Philosophers have held different views about the role that the 
emotions play in the cultivation of virtue. Many agree, however, that emotions occur as a 
consequence of the construals that human beings make of different situations. Yet, 
oftentimes people are unaware of the patterns of construals that make them people whom 
others would describe as angry, anxious, fearful, depressed, guilty, etc. As such, it is 
often the case that soldiers need help from others to better understand their patterns of 
perceiving the world. 
Soldiers need the help of those whom they know and trust to understand how 
their patterns of interpretation relate to their emotions. They also need help to apply 
moral concepts to the circumstances of their lives. Thus, any Army program for 
character development must account for the role that social influence plays in helping 
soldiers to develop holistically. This brings us to my concern in the present chapter. 
In this chapter, I want to consider the best way to leverage the social influence, 
i.e. interpersonal relationships, that exist in soldiers’ lives for use in their development as 
whole people. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Army Profession campaign 
employs one form of social influence—authority—in its approach to moral development. 
In so doing, however, it relies heavily on subject matter experts to counsel or teach 
soldiers. This is problematic, because these experts do not have an interpersonal 
relationship with the soldiers that they teach and, oftentimes, have not had the same 
experiences. As a result, many soldiers do not trust the experts that teach or counsel 
them. Subject matter experts, therefore, are not well-suited to help soldiers evaluate the 
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particular circumstances of their lives, see themselves as more than members of the 
profession of arms, and use self-reflection to select virtue-relevant goals that will 
integrate their multiple identities into a united moral self. Nor are they in a position to 
help soldiers assess their patterns of seeing the world that contribute to habits of 
emotional response that may lead to fragmentation. I propose that the interpersonal 
relationships that soldiers have with their friends and leaders build trust and hold great 
promise for a program of holistic character development in the Army. These 
relationships will be the focus of my model. 
In this way, my model avoids the particular problems that arise when chaplains 
serve as subject matter experts in professionalism. Whereas the Army’s current approach 
makes chaplains out to be experts in professionalism, something soldiers do not find 
credible, my model maximizes two strengths that chaplains have exercised reliably in 
their relationships with soldiers. Chaplains help soldiers integrate the professional and 
personal domains of their lives. In addition, chaplains help soldiers cope with a variety 
of emotions. Yet, they cannot help every soldier develop in these ways. They are few 
and far between in relation to the size of the total force.
82
 Thus, I propose that chaplains 
serve as mentors for leaders and soldiers in order to equip them to help their fellow 
soldiers who know and trust them to aspire to virtuous living.
83
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 I use the term “leader” to refer to a soldier that supervises and typically outranks another soldier. By 
“soldier” I mean someone who is a member of the Army and, in certain contexts, someone who is a 
subordinate. On the one hand, soldiers may be leaders who are themselves the subordinates of other 
leaders. On the other hand, soldiers may be subordinates who are not leaders and are the peers of other 
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Trust between Soldiers 
The bonds of friendship between soldiers are unique in many ways. When soldiers enter 
the Army, they naturally form new friendships with fellow soldiers. These relationships, 
often, are closer than their relationships with others outside the profession of arms. 
Consider the following excerpt from Stephen Ambrose’s book Band of Brothers, where 
he describes the bonds that members of Easy Company, 506
th
 Parachute Infantry 
Regiment developed with one another during their training in the United States before 
they deployed overseas. 
The result of these shared experiences was a closeness unknown to all 
outsiders. Comrades are closer than friends, closer than brothers. Their 
relationship is different from that of lovers. Their trust in, and knowledge 
of, each other is total. They got to know each other’s life stories, what 
they did before they came into the Army, where and why they 
volunteered, what they liked to eat and drink, what their capabilities were. 
On a night march they would hear a cough and know who it was; on a 
night maneuver they would see someone sneaking through the woods and 
know who it was from his silhouette.
84
 
Ambrose claims that the closeness between soldiers is unknown to those outside the 
profession of arms. I believe that this is right. It seems to me that the closeness of these 
relationships often stems from the difference in the type of work soldiers perform. 
Soldiers quickly learn even in peacetime that they must rely on their fellow soldiers, for 
instance, if they are going to complete basic training. In basic training, drill sergeants 
require their soldiers to complete tasks that foster, by design, soldiers’ reliance upon one 
another. A good example of this is the confidence obstacle course that all soldiers have 
to negotiate during their initial entry training. 
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One particular obstacle on this course is known as “The Skyscraper”, aptly 
named for its height. It is a tall tower consisting of five or six platforms that are situated 
further and further apart at each level. It is impossible for a soldier to scale this obstacle 
alone; the distance between platforms is too great at higher levels. Typically, a team of 
three or four soldiers will work together to scale the obstacle. When the distance to the 
next platform is too great, the team lifts one member to the next level. That soldier, 
along with the others remaining on the lower level, will help the next soldier to make it 
up, and so on and so forth until the entire team is at the top of the obstacle. 
Another example of the ways in which soldiers rely on one another is evident in 
the procedures that they conduct on an airborne operation as they prepare to exit the 
aircraft. Shortly before the paratroopers jump, the jumpmaster commands them to stand 
up in the plane, and hook their ripcords to a static line. Because they cannot check the 
parachutes that they wear on their own backs, the jumpmaster tells the paratroopers to 
check the equipment (i.e. the parachute, ripcord, etc.) of the paratrooper in front of them. 
After a visual inspection, each paratrooper slaps the backside of the one in front of him 
or her and says “Okay!” Moments later, they file to the door of the aircraft and jump out. 
 These examples illustrate the ways that soldiers learn to rely on one another to 
accomplish technical and tactical tasks. In both cases, however, there is more at stake 
than simply the accomplishment of something that one could not do alone. In most of 
their training even in peacetime, soldiers perform individual and collective tasks that are 
dangerous to greater or lesser degrees. The soldiers who negotiate “The Skyscraper” and 
the paratroopers who prepare to jump from the plane are performing actions that could 
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result in a life threatening fall. So, in the process of helping each other with these tasks, 
these soldiers also trust one another with their lives. The trust they build with each other 
in training will ultimately translate to their trust of one another in combat. 
J. Glen Gray describes the effect that danger both in training and in combat has 
on interpersonal relationships in this excerpt from his book The Warriors: Reflections on 
Men in Battle. 
If a civilian community has goals with more reality and power to endure 
than military goals, as I believe it does, its goals are, nevertheless, unable 
to generate the degree of loyalty that a military organization can… 
Organization for a common and concrete goal in peacetime organizations 
does not evoke anything like the degree of comradeship commonly 
known in war. Evidently, the presence of danger is distinctive and 
important. Men then are organized for a goal whose realization involves 
that real possibility of death or injury… Training can help a great deal in 
bringing this about more quickly and easily in an early stage. But training 
can only help to make actual what is inherent. As any commander knows, 
an hour or two of combat can do more to weld a unit together than can 
months of intensive training.
85
 
 
As Gray points out, soldiers, unlike their civilian counterparts, train for combat; and 
combat is a dangerous business. Members of the profession of arms assume a great deal 
of vulnerability and, as a result, form strong bonds of intimacy and trust with their fellow 
soldiers. 
I want to consider what this trust might mean for projects within the profession 
of arms that fall outside soldiers’ tactical and technical skills (i.e. their military 
expertise). If, as Ambrose and Gray suggest, soldiers know and trust one another more 
deeply than they do others, then it seems that soldiers in the same unit, like those in Easy 
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Company, are well-suited to help each other develop holistically across the many 
domains of their lives. In the sections that follow, I will try to show that this is the case. 
Before doing so, however, I want to consider whether the same kind of trust that we find 
among fellow soldiers can develop between soldiers and their leaders. 
Trust between Soldiers and Leaders 
The kind of trust that I have just described, one based on shared experiences and 
dangers, seems natural for soldiers to have with fellow soldiers. It is easy to see how, 
due to the nature of their training and missions, soldiers find themselves in the same 
circumstances and sharing the same experiences as their peers. This may be less obvious 
when it comes to soldiers and their leaders. Leaders and their subordinates have different 
roles and different responsibilities. Thus, it may seem that leaders and soldiers do not 
have much in common that would build trust between them. Furthermore, soldiers 
typically do not know their leaders as well as they know their peers. 
Many in the Army believe that leaders and subordinates should maintain a degree 
of professional distance. According to this belief, if leaders and subordinates get too 
familiar, then the subordinates may question whether to obey their leaders, or leaders 
may hesitate to order their subordinates to do things that might endanger their lives. 
Instead, both ought to maintain a professional distance so that there will not be any 
confusion about who is in charge. This view has a lot of merit, especially as it relates to 
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the maintenance of the good order and discipline within a unit that is crucial to its ability 
to accomplish combat missions.
86
 
 I am concerned, however, that oftentimes leaders and soldiers take “professional 
distance” to mean that the scope of their relationship with each other should be limited to 
the professional domain. On the one hand, leaders may investigate the details of their 
soldiers’ personal lives only when something in the personal domain negatively affects 
their job performance. On the other hand, leaders who want to know more about their 
subordinates’ backgrounds, interests, families, etc. find that they do not have the time to 
do so in the midst of a busy training and deployment schedule. I reject both forms of 
professional distance. They are another source of fragmentation in the Army. 
 Returning to Ambrose’s account of Easy Company’s preparation for combat, it is 
clear that some leaders and soldiers in the unit did not see their relationship with one 
another in a fragmented way, as limited to the professional domain. Several officers 
made the time to get to know who their soldiers were outside the Army. They had an 
extremely demanding training schedule and objective, making civilians into soldiers who 
could successfully fight against an experienced enemy yet to be determined, either the 
Japanese or German forces. Yet, these officers took an interest in their soldiers’ lives. In 
an interview with Ambrose, one of those soldiers, Robert Rader, made the following 
remark. 
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We couldn’t believe that people like Winters, Matheson, Nixon, and the 
others existed… These were first-class people, and to think these men 
would care and share their time and efforts with us seemed a miracle. 
They taught us to trust… [Winters] turned our lives around. He was 
openly friendly, genuinely interested in us.
87
 
 
Rader, who fought alongside Winters through Normandy and the Battle of the Bulge, 
trusted his leaders. This trust did not only apply to technical and tactical situations. 
Winters, to be sure, was an excellent tactician. Rader and others trusted their leaders to 
prepare them for combat, and to lead them well in combat. Yet, they also trusted their 
leaders to care for them as whole people—people who were more than soldiers. 
In the section that follows, I want to consider the relationship between trust and 
holistic character development. Given what we have seen in this and the previous section 
about the trust that soldiers have in their fellow soldiers and leaders, I propose that any 
program for character development in the Army must account for these interpersonal 
relationships.  
Trust and Holistic Character Development in the Army 
As we have seen in the last two sections, trust entails more than relying upon somebody 
for help with a particular project. People who trust others realize that they cannot 
successfully complete certain projects or achieve certain goals singlehandedly. In 
addition, and perhaps more importantly, people who trust others are willing to place the 
goods that they deem valuable into the care of other people. That is, they rely upon 
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others to show good will toward them, not to harm what they entrust to them, and to care 
for certain goods as much as they do (or perhaps more).
88
  
As I have shown in previous chapters, to have a united moral self is a good that is 
necessary for people to cultivate in order to live well. It consists of many other goods 
such as virtue, virtue-relevant goals, social roles and responsibilities, etc. Yet, given the 
fragmentation that threatens soldiers who serve in an era of persistent conflict, it is 
extremely challenging for soldiers to cultivate and care for these goods. 
Just as it is impossible for soldiers to negotiate “The Skyscraper” or complete an 
airborne mission singlehandedly, to cultivate a united moral self is not something that 
soldiers can accomplish on their own. In order to overcome fragmentation, soldiers will 
need the help of others. I propose, therefore, that soldiers collaborate primarily with their 
peers and their leaders to develop holistically. Given the trust that already exists between 
them as a result of shared experiences and dangers, I contend that peers and leaders are 
better suited than subject matter experts to assist their fellow soldiers to aspire to 
virtuous living. 
An Alternative Model for Character Development in the Army 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the type of care Corporal Sanchez could expect to 
receive if he divulged his overwhelming feelings of guilt. I noted the readiness that his 
fellow soldiers and leaders will likely have to refer him to subject matter experts in 
mental and emotional health, etc. This tendency to refer follows from the hyper-
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vigilance that soldiers and leaders have to emotional distress given the problem that 
suicide is in the Army. An additional reason for this tendency is that soldiers and leaders 
often lack the resources to address concerns in the mental, emotional, social, family, and 
spiritual domains. As a result, leaders and soldiers often construe that the best way for 
them to contribute to other soldiers’ holistic development is “to promote a culture that 
encourages individuals to seek behavioral health treatment, if needed.” 89 
Given what we have previously seen about the lack of trust that soldiers often 
have in subject matter experts, this approach seems inadequate. Many soldiers find it 
difficult to rely upon the good will of subject matter experts to care for and not harm the 
goods that they value.
90
 There is something sacred to the experiences and memories of 
combat. This is one reason why many soldiers fear that professional counselors will not 
understand or value their experiences appropriately.
 91
 They are far more likely to trust 
the good will of their fellow soldiers and leaders, who share the same experiences or 
similar ones, with these memories that affect their mental, emotional, social, family and 
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spiritual fitness. My alternative model for holistic character development in the Army, 
therefore, relocates the center of gravity for this project by taking it out of the 
community of experts and placing it in the community of soldiers. 
In his discussion of restoring the character of soldiers who have served in 
combat, Jonathan Shay suggests an appropriate role for professionals like mental health 
care providers. Consider the following passage from his book Odysseus in America: 
Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming. 
Restoration of thumos [character] and of the capacity for social trust 
happens only in community. This simple and seemingly innocent 
statement is actually quite subversive, because it casts doubt upon a great 
deal of what mental health professionals do (following the cultural and 
economic model of medicine), how they find their value in the world, 
how the mental health workplace is organized, and how power is used 
there. In fact, the overall effect of this simple statement is to push mental 
health professionals off of center stage in the drama of recovery from 
trauma, and to place them in the wings as stagehands.
92
 
 
The community where Shay recommends character development take place is the 
community of veterans—those who served in combat with each other, or those who 
share similar combat experiences. Although his concern is primarily with veterans 
(mostly from the Vietnam War) who have left the military, Shay’s view is the one I 
recommend for active duty Army organizations. 
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Character development for soldiers in today’s Army should take place in the 
community of soldiers within particular units. This is the community where they are 
most likely to trust others, and feel understood. I believe that this is an important reason 
why Army leaders should not outsource character development to subject matter experts, 
but should integrate character development into the daily life of their organizations. 
There may be occasions, of course, where a soldier needs immediate clinical care and a 
subject matter expert needs to be “center stage.” My worry, however, is that leaders 
overuse experts, refer soldiers to them too quickly, and in so doing ignore the other 
social influences that may better shape soldiers’ normal development. 
I will say more about the ways in which experts can serve effectively as 
“stagehands” when I discuss the role of the chaplain in holistic character development. 
For now, I want to look briefly at the way the community of soldiers is typically 
organized in the Army. I hope to show that there are organizational strengths that the 
Army employs on a daily basis with respect to accountability, chain of command, 
communication, tactical operations, training, etc. Currently, the Army does not 
adequately employ these strengths in its programs for character development. I suggest 
that were it to do so, the Army could implement a model for holistic character 
development that makes the most of the social influence that soldiers have with one 
another.  
Holistic Character Development within the Army’s Force Structure 
I believe that holistic character development for soldiers should occur within the context 
of the interpersonal relationships that exist between soldiers and leaders as part of the 
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Army’s force structure. Corporal Sanchez, for instance, has a section leader (Sergeant 
Taylor). At the same time, Sanchez is a team leader, which means he supervises two 
other scouts who are members of his team. Within this group of four soldiers, therefore, 
there is a community that is structured for accountability, communication, teaching, and 
mentorship. As we move outward from this small community to the rest of Sanchez’s 
scout platoon, we find that there are other leaders—team leaders, section leaders, a 
platoon sergeant, a platoon leader—as well as other scouts who are members of teams 
but are not in leadership positions. Thus, at each level of organization within the platoon 
there are leaders, subordinates, and peers. This structure exists throughout the Army in 
different types of organizations (i.e. combat and combat support), and at every level of 
command (i.e. company, battalion, brigade, division, etc.). 
Every leader in the Army directly supervises no more than three or four soldiers. 
As a result, every subordinate has a leader who is accessible and with whom they 
interact every day. Furthermore, every leader and subordinate has peers within the same 
organization who share the same rank, duties, and responsibilities. These relationships 
that are inherent to every Army organization seem well-suited for leaders to mentor their 
subordinates and for peers to help one another. 
 I am not saying anything new here. The Army organizes its forces the way I have 
described in order to optimize command and control and to distribute authority and 
responsibility throughout its ranks.
93
 At the same time, the Army also relies upon leaders 
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and soldiers at every level to assess the soldiers with whom they serve in order to 
identify their strengths and weaknesses, and develop their technical and tactical skills 
accordingly. So, when it comes to honing domain-specific skills, i.e. technical and 
tactical training, much of what the Army does is situated in the context of the 
interpersonal relationships among soldiers and leaders; it is a mentorship model. With 
respect to the Army’s current model for character development, however, this is not the 
case. 
 In its approach to character development, the Army departs from the mentorship 
model. In its place, leaders and subordinates rely upon subject matter experts to teach 
them what it means to be a professional soldier. That said, there are instances where the 
subject matter expert is a member of a troop unit. This is the case for chaplains who 
attend the MAPET course, receive their certification in Army Profession concepts, and 
return to their units. Chaplains in these cases are much more accessible to members of 
the unit than other subject matter experts. Yet, more often than not, they still approach 
character development like any other expert. They teach Army Profession concepts to 
groups of soldiers in the unit.  There is nothing like the mentorship that occurs with 
technical and tactical tasks taking place in terms of holistic character development. I 
contend that this needs to change. 
Leaders, subordinates, and peers alike must mentor and help one another to 
develop holistically as part of their interpersonal relationships. I have given some basic 
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conceptual resources and practices in this thesis for them to use in that common project. 
For example, leaders and peers can help other soldiers use self-reflection to judge who 
they are (i.e. their professional and personal identities) and who they want to be. They 
may help one another select virtue-relevant goals to unite their identities in order to 
overcome fragmentation. They may also help one another see how different emotions 
occur as a consequence of the construal that they make of different situations. Thus, 
leaders and peers could help their fellow soldiers better understand their patterns of 
perceiving the particular circumstances of their lives. In this way, they can help each 
other work out the conceptual resources I have provided for holistic character 
development—resources that draw from virtue ethics and its strengths in the area of 
holistic character development.  
In addition to the conceptual resources and practices I have just summarized, 
members of every Army organization have an additional source of help to equip them to 
mentor others—their unit chaplain. In the section that follows, I want to sketch a role for 
chaplains in soldiers’ character development that I believe is more promising than their 
current role as subject matter experts in professionalism. Before I do that, however, I 
want to make some final recommendations that are compatible with my alternative 
model for character development within the community of soldiers. 
Within their organizations, commanders must carve out more time in their 
training schedules for leaders and soldiers to mentor each other in the ways I have 
suggested above. Many commanders prioritize training for the technical and tactical 
skills that they believe their soldiers need to successfully complete combat operations. I 
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am not saying that commanders should neglect that training; it is essential given the 
Army’s mission and purpose. I am recommending, however, that commanders prioritize 
holistic development in concrete ways. For instance, they can allocate time on the 
training schedule for leaders and soldiers to meet with one another to work out the 
details of what I have proposed throughout this thesis.
94
 
The Army is not losing soldiers due to their technical or tactical shortcomings. It 
is losing soldiers to injuries of one kind or another that result from problems in the 
mental, emotional, social, family, and spiritual domains of their lives.
 95
 I believe that it 
is urgent, given 12 years of persistent conflict, for the Army to give its soldiers more 
time to help one another work out the concepts of holistic character development that I 
have presented in this thesis. On the one hand, the model I am proposing does not 
require any large scale administrative, organizational, or fiscal obligations. On the other 
hand, it requires a lot of leaders and soldiers in the Army. According to my model, 
leaders and soldiers must extend their relationships with each other beyond the 
professional domain. They must trust one another with the goods of their lives that are 
external to the profession of arms. They must exercise good will toward each other, care 
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regulation states further that “periodic ethics training will be provided to Army personnel as determined by 
their commanders or supervisors, consistent with the unit or organization annual training plan, or as 
required by the Army annual ethics training plan. Army personnel not required to attend annual ethics 
training are encouraged to take annual training. Additional annual acquisition ethics training will be 
provided for Army personnel working in an acquisition or contracting field as determined by their 
commanders or supervisors.” Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., December 18, 2009, 159.  
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 During 2012, as an example, more soldiers in the Army died as a result of suicide than as a result of 
combat operations. Ernesto Londoño, “Military Suicides Rise to a Record 349, Topping Number of 
Troops Killed in Combat,” The Washington Post, January 14, 2013. 
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for each other, and treat each other as people who are more than soldiers and not just a 
means to accomplishing the mission. In light of these requirements, I believe that they 
will need additional help to do this. Thus, as I close this chapter, I want to consider the 
ways that chaplains could mentor and equip leaders and soldiers as they adopt these 
concepts and practices. 
The Role of the Chaplain in Soldiers’ Holistic Development 
We have already seen the problems that arise when chaplains teach professional ethics. I 
suggest that chaplains should assist leaders and soldiers to use the resources I have given 
in this thesis to help their soldiers develop. 
Army chaplains are well-suited to assist leaders and soldiers with the holistic 
development of their fellow soldiers. Like other caregivers, chaplains have experience 
counseling soldiers, helping them relate the professional and personal domains of their 
lives, and talking with soldiers about their emotions. These capabilities will help 
chaplains become more quickly adept at applying the resources and practices I have 
mentioned. Chaplains, however, are also in a better position than most other caregivers 
to assist leaders and soldiers because they are assigned to troop units in the Army. 
Doctors and psychologists, for example, are typically assigned to hospitals and clinics. 
The Army assigns chaplains as organic members of troop units down to the 
battalion level. Chaplains are part of the daily life of these Army organizations. They 
participate in physical training, go to formations, visit the motor pool, attend staff 
meetings, go to the field, ruck march, deploy, etc. with their soldiers. As a result, the 
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leaders and soldiers in a unit get to know, and hopefully trust, their chaplain. Consider 
the following comments from a former Army commander, Colonel Cole Kingseed. 
Combat veterans know full well the positive influence a chaplain has on 
unit morale, and few at any level would go into combat again without 
one.  Leaders should therefore encourage the chaplain to spend as much 
time as possible with the soldiers.  Although he is a commissioned 
officer, his place, more than that of any other officer, is with the 
soldiers.
96
 
 
As Kingseed points out in these remarks, a chaplain can be a valuable resource for Army 
units, especially in combat. We have seen, however, that chaplains are spread thin across 
the Army. Chaplains may be a positive influence. Still, they should avoid being center 
stage in soldiers’ character development. They should help their unit adopt a vision for 
character development based off of the model I have presented. 
 Chaplains at the battalion level, for example, may begin this project by proposing 
a mentorship model for character development to their battalion and company 
commanders. Among other things, this proposal might include relating the success that 
leaders and soldiers typically have in developing soldiers in their technical and tactical 
abilities by following a mentorship model. They could also introduce commanders to the 
conceptual resources that virtue ethics provides for character development, and the 
practices (like self-reflection and goal-setting) necessary for soldiers to apply these 
concepts. They may even appeal to the example of other military leaders like Hal Moore 
who, as we saw in the last chapter, share a similar view of holistic development and who 
mentored his subordinates accordingly. Furthermore, if successful in getting a 
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 Colonel Cole C. Kingseed and Chaplain (Major) R. Michael Coffey, “The Battalion Chaplain,” The 
Army Chaplaincy, http://www.usachcs.army.mil/TACarchive/ACWIN98I/Coffey.html. 
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mentorship model off the ground, chaplains could troubleshoot problems that may arise 
in mentoring or other interpersonal relationships where leaders and peers may be acting 
in unhelpful or even harmful ways. This type of troubleshooting is something chaplains 
do regularly between members of the chain of command apart from any particular model 
for character development. In spite of the advantages I have just mentioned, however, 
chaplains should expect some objections from commanders to this proposal. 
It is likely that many commanders will see this approach as adding a set of duties 
and responsibilities that they do not have the time to perform. At this point, I am not sure 
how chaplains should respond to that objection. Unless commanders at higher levels in 
the Army see value to this approach and emphasize its importance to their subordinate 
commanders, it will be difficult for chaplains to persuade them to adopt this model. If 
commanders are not persuaded, then I recommend that chaplains begin to mentor 
individual leaders and soldiers on their own. I do not recommend that chaplains take up 
mentoring every leader and soldier in the unit; that would be an impossible task. 
Chaplains, however, could begin to meet with leaders and soldiers whom they know 
well, and introduce them to this model. If it proves to be successful, as I believe it will, 
then it may be that other leaders and soldiers will see its results and adopt the same 
approach.
97
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 In correspondence with me over some of the ideas I present in this thesis a research analyst at CAPE, 
Mr. Frank Licameli, wrote: “Your ideas about fragmentation or the dividing of one’s self into professional 
and personal domains, supports and puts into clearer focus some of our recent work on Senior Army 
Leader ethics.  A glance at any of the recent headlines about leaders in trouble, appears to support your 
thesis that this is a very real issue that needs to be addressed. Your work is important to the future of the 
Army Profession and has the potential to not only better define the issue, but to provide potential 
solutions and ways to improve our moral development programs.” Email from francis.licameli@usma.edu, 
April 23, 2013. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
On November 15, 2012, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta directed the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey “to work with the other members of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review how to better foster a culture of stewardship among 
our most senior military officers.” The memo included Panetta’s requirement for each 
service’s Chief of Staff to provide recommendations on “how to better foster a culture of 
value-based decision-making and stewardship.” He also stated, “Beyond mere 
compliance with the rules, I also expect senior officers and civilian executives to 
exercise sound judgment in their stewardship of government resources and in their 
personal conduct.” 98 
Panetta’s order identifies the importance for members of the profession of arms 
to be just not only in their conduct of war, but also in the conduct of their personal lives. 
It comes almost two years after the Army published a white paper in response to its 
assessment that it had “struggled in some areas to maintain the highest standards of the 
Profession of Arms.”99 Given Panetta’s concerns and the recent moral failures of senior 
Army officer, it seems that the Army Profession campaign has not achieved its objective 
to help members of the profession to maintain its highest standards. 
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 United States Department of Defense, Statement by the Press Secretary on Review of General and Flag 
Officer Ethics, No. 902-12, November 15, 2012. 
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 An Army White Paper: The Profession of Arms, Ft. Monroe, VA: Headquarters, Training and Doctrine 
Command, December 8, 2010, 1. 
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Ironically, the features of the Army Profession campaign that inspire men and 
women to identify themselves as professional soldiers also lead them to neglect other 
aspects of their lives taken as a whole. This disintegration of soldiers’ lives into 
professional and personal selves that grow more and more isolated from one another 
means that they are likely not to develop character in a holistic way. Furthermore, the 
failure to develop character holistically makes it more difficult for soldiers to exercise 
sound judgment in their personal conduct, which is an ongoing concern for those who 
are responding to Panetta’s directive. 
A further irony of the Army Profession campaign is that several findings from 
the research that undergirds the program suggest the inadequacy of its approach to 
character development. In order to answer the question “What does it mean to be a 
professional soldier?” the Army conducted surveys, forums, etc. across all of its 
cohorts—officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted soldiers and 
civilians. Consider the following sample from its findings.
100
 
As 98 percent of Army Professionals consider themselves professionals 
and a similar number view the Army as a profession, the Army is already 
experiencing success in internalizing a professional identity with most 
Soldiers and Army civilians. 
Remarkably, over 90 percent of the force stated that they are willing to 
put the Army’s needs above their own – the epitome of selfless discipline. 
(The report interprets this intention as morally appropriate) 
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 Army Profession Campaign Annual Report, Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, US Army Training and 
Doctrine Command, April 2, 2012. The Army conducted two surveys with over 41,000 respondents, 
organized focus groups at five installations with over 500 participants, 15 forums with hundreds of 
attendees, as well as social media discussions. The Army also consulted over 35 prior studies for 
comparison. 
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All levels of the Army are commenting on the need to improve on 
mentoring, coaching, and counseling skills that have diminished over the 
course of the past decade. 
Soldiers have noted an erosion of certain interpersonal skills, such as 
coaching, teaching, counseling, and mentoring. 
Repeated deployments and high operational tempos have caused Soldiers 
to become greatly concerned about living up to Army values while giving 
the proper time and devotion to their families. (The report did not 
recommend a corresponding course of action)
 101
  
It is worth highlighting several facts from these findings. First, most members of the 
Army Profession already see themselves as professionals. Second, most soldiers see the 
Army as the most important domain of their lives. Third, leaders are not mentoring their 
soldiers. Fourth, soldiers are aware that they are failing to meet their obligations in other 
domains of life, i.e. their family life. Given these facts, it is hard to see how a campaign 
that stresses professionalism, limits moral development to the professional domain, and 
relies upon subject matter experts instead of mentors is going to successfully address the 
findings of this research and contribute to the holistic character development of soldiers 
that the Department of Defense and previous Army doctrine envision.  
The Army Profession campaign promotes professional concepts that, as I have 
shown in this thesis, are insufficient for holistic development and exacerbate the problem 
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 Army Profession Campaign Annual Report, April 2, 2012, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14; emphasis and parenthetical 
comments mine. A similar observation is made in TRADOC Pam 525-3-7, Fort Monroe, VA: 
Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 11, 2008, 12: “The Army family has a 
major impact on combat readiness today and there is every reason to believe this impact will be just as 
critical in the future. Experience and extensive research demonstrate a synergy between the unit, the 
Soldier, and the family that can positively affect retention and commitment to the unit, the mission, and 
the Army.” Somewhat of a solution is proposed: “Military leaders must be able to assist Soldiers’ and 
families having trouble and at the same time ensure that the unit’s mission is accomplished. Leaders 
require the skill and knowledge to direct Soldier and family members to military and civilian services 
designed to correct or mitigate family related stress. Leaders that respected and trusted subordinates, made 
off duty time predictable, treated Soldier and family problems as unit problems, and fostered family 
readiness groups, found that attention to family support added to the Soldier’s warfighting capabilities” 
(13). 
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of fragmentation. In its place, I have championed a model for soldiers’ character 
development situated in virtue ethics that addresses the problem of fragmentation, and 
can begin to provide at least some of the resources needed to understand and perhaps 
mitigate the fragmentation of soldiers. This model inspires soldiers to develop character 
in the professional and personal domains of their moral selves. In so doing, it encourages 
soldiers to acquire goods that are external to the Army profession but are relevant for 
members of that profession. 
I have stressed the need and ability of this model to account for the role that 
emotion plays in developing character. I also provided an account of this model of 
character development in a manner that highlights the strengths and resources of the 
Army’s current force structure, as well as the Army Profession campaign and 
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness systems. This model also incorporates the capabilities 
that chaplains possess in a more appropriate and promising way. In so doing, I hope to 
have shown that there are good reasons to believe that the development of virtuous 
soldiers involves more than professional development. 
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